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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the three decades since the advent of the Federal Circuit
in 1982, we have seen the slow demise of the nonobviousness
requirement. Judicially created in the nineteenth century and
codified in section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 1 the nonobviousness
requirement seeks to limit the availability of patents to "those
inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the
inducement of a patent."2 While patent law's novelty requirement
requires that an invention be new-that it represent an advance
3
over the existing art-nonobviousness requires something more.
However phrased, whether as "invention" in the original, judicially
created version or as "nonobviousness" since its codification, the
requirement asks not whether some technological advance has
occurred, but whether there has been sufficient technological
advance to warrant the grant of a patent. 4 The whole point of the
doctrine is to separate trivial advances from more substantial
5
advances and to ensure that only the latter receive patents.
Before the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982,
nonobviousness served as the primary gatekeeper for patents. An
empirical study of appellate patent litigation from the 1940s
through 1982 reveals that when patent holders sued for
infringement and lost, they lost approximately 65% of the time on
the grounds that their patent was obvious. 6 With the rise of the
Federal Circuit, the height of the nonobviousness hurdle has
steadily declined.
From 1984 through 2001, obviousness
represented the reason a patent holder lost in less than 15% of
cases on average. 7 By 2005, the doctrine had reached its nadir. In
that year, when patent holders sued for infringement and lost,

1 Act of July 14, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 722, 798 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 103 (2006)).
2 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
3 See discussion infra Part II.A.
4 See discussion infra Part II.A.
5 See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
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obviousness was the reason in less than 5% of the cases.8 While
nonobviousness formally remained a requirement of patent
protection, to the Federal Circuit, almost nothing was obvious.
A potential turning point arose in 2007, however, with the
Court's decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.9 In its
first substantive return to the nonobviousness requirement since
the Federal Circuit's advent, the Court both rejected some of the
key restrictions the Federal Circuit had placed on the obviousness
doctrine' ° and broadened the circumstances under which
obviousness could be found." Taken at face value, the Court's
decision seemed poised to reinvigorate the nonobviousness
requirement.
Both anecdotal and empirical analysis of the Federal Circuit's
decisions after KSR suggest that the decision has had some
impact. In finding patents obvious in individual cases, the Federal
Circuit has cited extensively to the Supreme Court's holding and
reasoning in KSR. 12 And since KSR, when a patent holder loses,
obviousness is the reason in nearly 20% of the cases. This is
somewhat above the 15% average for which obviousness accounted
in the pre-KSR Federal Circuit era and well above the 5% level of
losses for which obviousness accounted in 2005.13 The Court's
decision in KSR thus seems to have helped the nonobviousness
requirement recover, at least somewhat, from its near-death
experience.
Even following KSR, however, the nonobviousness requirement
remains a pale shadow of its former self. While the 20% of losses
for which obviousness accounted since KSR is somewhat above the
15% average in the pre-KSR Federal Circuit era, it remains a far
cry from the 65% of losses in the pre-Federal Circuit era.
When we look for reasons behind the nonobviousness
requirement's diminished vitality, we find, inter alia, a fear of

s See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.

9 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
10 Id. at 415.
11 Id. at 417, 419-20.

See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
13 See discussion infra Part II.c.
12
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hindsight. As articulated by the Federal Circuit, in determining
obviousness, it is not proper to use the inventors' own work
against them. 14 Having seen how the inventor solved a problem, it
becomes trivial to use that solution as a roadmap to piece together
the prior art and conclude that the solution was obvious. 15 Over
and over again, the Federal Circuit has reversed a district court's
conclusion of obviousness and accused the district court of
resorting to such improper hindsight. 6 On those occasions when a
majority of a panel concludes that an invention was obvious, we
often find a dissent chiding the majority for resorting to improper
hindsight.1 7 And when courts seek to justify existing doctrine or
14 See In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting the importance of "casting
the mind back to the time of invention" to avoid the "insidious effect of a hindsight syndrome
wherein that which only the invention taught is used against its teacher" (citation omitted));
see also Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("In deciding
the obviousness question, the district court looked to knowledge taught by the inventor
Caveney, in his patents and in his testimony, and then used that knowledge against its
teacher."), vacated, 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986) (per curiam) (vacating for failing to explain the
proper standard of review in reviewing obviousness determinations).
15 See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("It is impermissible to use the
claimed invention as an instruction manual or 'template' to piece together the teachings of
the prior art so that the claimed invention is rendered obvious."); Interconnect Planning
Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ('The invention must be viewed not with
the blueprint drawn by the inventor, but in the state of the art that existed at the time.").
16 See, e.g., ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 546 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concluding that
in the absence of a "teaching or suggestion" to combine the prior art references, jury must
have resorted to improper hindsight); Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat
GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Defining the problem in terms of its solution
reveals improper hindsight in the selection of the prior art relevant to obviousness."); Cont'l
Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("When prior art
references require selective combination by the court to render obvious a subsequent
invention, there must be some reason for the combination other than the hindsight gleaned
from the invention itself." (quoting Interconnect Planning Corp., 774 F.2d at 1143));
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding "that
the district court impermissibly used a hindsight analysis in determining that the claimed
invention would have been obvious and did not properly analyze and consider secondary
indicia of nonobviousness"); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796
F.2d 443, 448 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (reversing district court's conclusion of obviousness and
declaring it the result of "improper hindsight analysis").
17 See, e.g., Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Barr Labs., Inc., 575 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (Newman, J., dissenting) ('CThe evidence in this case is a better measure of obviousness
than is the hindsight science of judges .... ); Erico Int'l Corp. v. Vutec Corp., 516 F.3d 1350,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting) (The district court considered the relative
simplicity of the invention, a factor that appears to have influenced my colleagues, who with
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some doctrinal innovation limiting the scope of obviousness, they
often insist that the limitation is necessary to prevent the use of
improper hindsight.' 8
This paralyzing fear of hindsight has received academic support
as well. In a pair of articles, Professor Gregory Mandel has
presented results from simulations that he believes demonstrate
the potential for substantial hindsight bias in patent litigation. 19
In his simulations, he presented one group of law students with a
description of a problem to be solved, described the available prior
art, and asked them if they thought a solution would be obvious
(the "foresight" scenario). 20 To a second group, he presented the
same problem and prior art and asked again if a solution would be
obvious, but before asking, he added one thing: a brief description
of the solution that had been discovered (the "hindsight"
scenario). 21 Finding a statistically significant and quite large
difference between the percentages of respondents who found the
invention obvious in the foresight and hindsight scenarios,

perfect hindsight find that it would have been obvious to make Erico's J-hook by combining
the OBO Betterment reference, the EIA standards, and Mr. Laughlin's testimony."); In re
Omeprazole Patent Litig., 483 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting)
('Hindsight is not an available analytical mechanism to show obviousness."); Para-Ordnance
Mfg. v. SGS Imps. Int'l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Archer, C.J., dissenting)
('The obviousness analysis in this case is a classic example of hindsight.").
18 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (justifying
relevancy of the secondary considerations on the grounds that they "may also serve 'to
guard against slipping into use of hindsight,' and to resist the temptation to read into the
prior art the teachings of the invention in issue" (citation omitted)); In re Dembiczak, 175
F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Our case law makes clear that the best defense against the
subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis is rigorous
application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation to combine prior
art references."); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[T]he suggestion to
combine requirement stands as a critical safeguard against hindsight analysis and rote
application of the legal test for obviousness.").
19 Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006)
[hereinafter Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious]; Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious 11"
Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007).
20 Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious, supra note 19, at 1408-09.
21 Id.
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Professor Mandel proclaimed his results proof of an equally large
22
hindsight bias in patent litigation.
If it exists, the risk of hindsight bias suggests the need for an
easier-to-satisfy obviousness standard. If our obviousness decision
makers are overly likely to find obviousness in any event because
of hindsight bias, then we would need an easier-to-satisfy
obviousness standard to even things out.
Yet before we give in to our fear, perhaps a closer look at
hindsight is in order. By its express terms, section 103 of the
Patent Act directs us to determine whether the advance at issue
"would have been obvious at the time the invention was made." 23
While this statutory language expressly states that obviousness is
to be determined at the time the invention was made, it does not
expressly forbid the use of facts arising after the date of invention
in making that determination.
Indeed, not even the Federal
Circuit prohibits the use of hindsight altogether in making
obviousness determinations. To the contrary, the Federal Circuit
expressly requires the consideration of facts occurring after "the
time the invention was made" in the context of so-called
"secondary factors," such as the commercial success of a patented
invention, copying of the patented invention by others, or an
invention's widespread licensing. 24 These facts necessarily arise
after the time of invention and thus represent hindsight, yet the
Federal Circuit has emphasized that they may be some of "the
most probative and cogent evidence available" on the obviousness
issue. 25 Somewhat curiously, in some opinions, the Federal Circuit
will insist that hindsight must not be used in one sentence, and
then in the very next insist that after-arising facts, such as
22 Id. at 1393 (finding that "hindsight bias prejudices patent decisions far more than
anticipated").
23 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). For patent applications filed after March 16, 2013, the
America Invents Act changes the critical date from "at the time the invention was made" to
"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention." Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284 (2011). This change does not affect the
analysis in this Article, however. Courts will still use after-arising facts such as commercial
success in evaluating obviousness, and they will still want to avoid inappropriately using
the inventors' own work against them.
24 Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
25 Id. at 1538.
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commercial success, must be considered, without recognizing the
26
apparent contradiction in the two statements.
Moreover, attaching the hindsight label to the patentee's own
work seems literally inaccurate. Hindsight refers to the use of
facts arising after the key date-here, the date of invention. Yet
none of the patentee's work occurs after the date of invention; to
the contrary, almost by definition, the patentee's work occurs
before and leads up to the invention itself. How then does
consideration of the patentee's invention represent the use of
hindsight? The patentee's own invention does not arise after the
date of invention, but simultaneously with it. Rather than serving
a useful analytical role, the word "hindsight" seems more often to
play the role of a rhetorical trump card, offered to justify a given
outcome without the need for pesky reasoning.
Putting the hindsight label to one side, the key question is
whether-and if so, when-a consideration of the patentee's own
work can improve the accuracy of our obviousness determinations.
From an efficiency perspective, the goal of the patent system is to
provide an inventor with that set of exclusive rights that will
enable the inventor to recover neither more nor less than a
reasonable return on the research and development investment 27
in a desirable innovation that would not otherwise be recoverable
through the ordinary workings of the market. 28 We do not want to
26 For example, in his recent opinion in Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
Chief Judge Rader wrote: "Importantly, the great challenge of the obviousness judgment is
proceeding without any hint of hindsight. Further, secondary considerations may often be
the most probative and cogent evidence [of nonobviousness] in the record." 655 F.3d 1364,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). He then proceeded to reverse a jury's verdict of obviousness based in part on the
invention's widespread acceptance and commercial success in the relevant industry. Id. at
1379. The Supreme Court made the same mistake in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
City, where it justified the relevance of secondary considerations on the ground that they
"may also serve 'to guard against slipping into use of hindsight.'" 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966)
(quoting Monroe Auto Equip. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 412 (6th Cir.
1964)).
27 This may include some portion of the investment in research paths that do not pan out.
See Glynn S. Lunney, Patent Law, the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court: A Quiet
Revolution, 11 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5 n.11 (2004) (acknowledging that proper patent
protection must take costs of failed research into account).
28 See id. at 5 (arguing that patent protection should be provided only if"necessary to

48
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provide an inventor with an overbroad set of rights because
providing a set of rights that would enable the recovery of more
than a reasonable return would, among other things, impose
unnecessary deadweight losses on society.29 Nor do we want to
provide the inventor with an overly narrow set of rights, because
providing a set of rights that would provide less than a reasonable
return may lead our inventor to decide not to make the necessary
investment in the first place.3 0 The task of matching a set of rights
to the necessary economic return is made difficult by the fact that
the set of rights necessary to bring forth innovation can vary
considerably both across different industries and even for different
innovations within a given industry.3 1 Some innovations may
require very little extra incentive from the patent system; other
innovations may require a great deal of extra incentive.
Given that the patent system provides a uniform term of twenty
years 32 and a uniform set of exclusive rights to "make[ ], use[ ],
offer[] to sell, or sell[ ] any patented invention,"3 3 patent law
incorporates two principal levers or legal doctrines that we can use
to match the financial rewards from a patent to an inventor's
otherwise unrecoverable investment. First, we can vary the scope
of protection and the associated economic returns by narrowing or
broadening claim scope. 34 Second, we can vary the expected
secure individual innovation's ex ante expected profitability").
29 See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1097, 1138 (2011) (using example of AIDS treatment to illustrate the high social
costs of overbroad patent rights).
30 See, e.g., id. (noting that narrow patent protection at the time of the cotton gin's
invention meant that Eli Whitney received almost no reward).
31 Professors Mark Lemley and Dan Burk first identified the problem of using a uniform
patent regime to promote innovation across industries. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1155 (2002)

(arguing that new industries are not well-served by patent system because of fundamental
shifts in technology); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law,
89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577 (2003) (noting "deep structural differences in how industries
innovate"). Professor Lunney first identified the problem of matching a uniform set of
patent rights to provide varying levels of incentives for innovations within an industry. See
Lunney, supra note 27, at 5 (arguing that a uniform patent system protects "those
innovative products that would have been produced with no or less protection").
32 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
33 Id.
§ 271(a).
34 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
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economic returns by using the nonobviousness doctrine to create a
higher or lower risk of invalidity- for any given patented
invention. 35 In either case, the goal is to ensure a match between
the expected return on any given desirable innovation and the
36
innovation's expected research and development costs.
This suggests, in turn, that for any given patented invention,
there is some socially optimal risk of an obviousness result. This
socially optimal risk is defined precisely as the risk of invalidity
such that the expected revenue from the patent plus the expected
revenue from the ordinary workings of the market exactly cover
the expected research and development cost of any given desirable
37
innovation.
For our purposes here, the key question then becomes whether
any given evidence, hindsight or otherwise, will lead the judge or
jury to make obviousness determinations closer to this social ideal.
Under existing law, we permit the judge or jury to consider
admitted hindsight evidence, such as commercial success,
presumably because we believe that it improves the fit or accuracy
of obviousness determinations, bringing actual outcomes closer to
the social ideal.38 That an invention became a commercial success
after the date of invention may provide some evidence that an
invention was hard and hence not obvious at the time it was
made. 39 Commercial success is not, of course, infallible evidence of
nonobviousness. As others have pointed out, the inferential chain
from the fact of commercial success to the question of obviousness
is long, complex, and easily broken. 40 Certainly, some nonobvious

90 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 839 (1990) (noting that the scope of a patent determines how many
competing products are excluded and shows the patent's economic impact).
35 See Lunney, supra note 27, at 72-73 (describing the economic effect of multiple
obviousness verdicts on entities with many patents).
36 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37 See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
363, 413-17 (2001) (describing how the creativity invested could quantify obviousness of
invention).
38 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
39 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1966) (explaining relevance
of secondary considerations).
40 See Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966
SUP. CT. REV. 293, 332 (identifying four inferential steps from commercial success to
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innovations meet with commercial success, but it is equally true
that some products meet with commercial success without any
underlying innovation at all. Despite the potential to mislead, we
nevertheless admit evidence of commercial success and leave to
the fact-finder the choice of which inference to make.
Given that we expressly permit the use of some hindsight
evidence in obviousness determinations, it is a little difficult to see
why the fact-finder is forbidden to consider the patentee's own
invention on that issue. If obviousness reflects a judgment as to
whether an invention was substantial or trivial, difficult or easy,
for a person having ordinary skill in the art, then whether the
invention at issue was hard or easy for the patentee would seem
relevant. Certainly, the inferential chain from the difficulty the
invention presented for the patentee to the difficulty it would have
presented to a person having ordinary skill in the art is far more
direct and straightforward than the inferential chain for many of
the secondary considerations. 4' If it was easy for the patentee,
that suggests that it would have been easy (and hence obvious) for
a person having ordinary skill in the art. If it was hard for the
patentee, then we may infer that it would have been hard for a
person having ordinary skill in the art. 42

Admittedly, the

inferential chain is not foolproof. A fact-finder may mistakenly
infer obviousness from the fact that it was easy for the patentee,
when the ease was due to the patentee's exceptional skill in the
art. Or a fact-finder may mistakenly infer nonobviousness from
the fact that it was hard for the patentee, when the difficulty was
43
due to the patentee's lack of skill in the art.

nonobviousness: (1) success is due to innovation; (2) success was perceived before the
innovation's development; (3) efforts were made to improve the innovation after commercial
success was perceived; and (4) that other men of skill in the art made similar efforts, but
the patentee was the first to reduce his development to practice).
41 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
42 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 35-36 (holding that evidence of competitors' difficulty in
creating the patented product was viable evidence of nonobviousness)
43 One of the co-authors has previously warned of this type of risk before. See Lunney,
supra note 37, at 415-16 (explaining the need to consider inventor's skill and efficiency of
investors in determining creative investment).
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Yet, as with other evidence, the question is not whether
admitting evidence of the difficulty of the invention for the
patentee creates a risk of mistakes in a particular case here or
there, but whether it introduces a systematic bias. We should thus
ask whether the use of this evidence would tend to lead a factfinder consistently astray-to find an invention obvious when it
was really nonobvious, or to find it nonobvious when it was really
obvious. 44 Unfortunately, on this question we do not have much in
the way of answers.
Professor Mandel's work does not answer this question. He
presents a foresight scenario to one group of respondents and a
hindsight scenario to a second. 45 Finding a difference between the
percentages of respondents who found the invention obvious in the
two scenarios, he labels the difference "bias" without any further
analysis. 46 There are several problems with this approach. Most
fundamental is his implicit assumption that the foresight scenario
represents the "correct" outcome. Assuming that the foresight
scenario is correct, all he needs in order to pronounce the
hindsight scenario "incorrect" is to find a difference between the
two scenarios. But the relevant question is not whether the
obviousness outcome is different in the hindsight scenario from the
foresight scenario, but which obviousness outcome comes closer to
the socially optimal risk of obviousness. Unless we know or can
estimate the socially optimal risk of obviousness, we cannot
meaningfully distinguish, based upon his work, whether the use of
hindsight, as he defines it, leads to a risk of obviousness closer to
47
or further from the socially optimal risk.
44 Or, given patent law's presumption of validity, to find that obviousness was not proven.
41 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
46

See Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious, supranote 19, at 1408-11.

47 For his scenarios, Professor Mandel used actual cases, one involving a patent on a

baseball with marks on it to indicate finger positions for various pitches, and another with a
patent for a fishing lure. We could, and will, look at how the courts resolved those cases as
evidence of a socially optional obviousness standard. But that is not a complete answer,
either. The results in those cases may themselves have been driven by either an
insufficient or undue fear of hindsight bias. When we refer to a "correct" resolution of the
obviousness issue, we refer to the decision that a judge would reach in order to maximize
social utility given perfect information as to the costs and benefits to society of finding a
given patented invention obvious or nonobvious. It is possible but unlikely that the actual
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Disagreeing with Professor Mandel, we believe that allowing
the decision maker to know the fact and nature of an invention can
lead the decision maker to an obviousness outcome closer to the
socially optimal outcome. Whether treated as an issue of law or
fact, our decision maker on the nonobviousness issue necessarily
has imperfect information. Moreover, we ask decision makers to
judge whether the invention "would have been obvious.., to a
person having ordinary skill in the art," when they are in fact not
such persons themselves. 48 Given this background, it would seem
that more information on the issue, rather than less, would
necessarily improve our decision maker's ability to get the
obviousness issue right. Before we condemn the use of the
patentee's own activities as impermissible hindsight, we should
consider whether
such information plays a legitimate
informational role-legitimate in the sense that it improves our
decision makers' ability to decide the obviousness issue
consistently and correctly.
To try and answer that more difficult question, we have taken
Professor Mandel's approach and extended it. 49 As he did, we used
a survey format and students as our subjects. We divided them
into groups and presented each group with a different scenario.
For the first two groups, we followed Professor Mandel's format
exactly. We presented the groups with foresight and hindsight
scenarios, respectively, and asked if a given invention would have
been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art.
As Professor Mandel did, we found a significant and large
difference between the percentages of respondents who found the
invention obvious between the two scenarios. In the foresight
scenario, 48% of respondents found the invention obvious; in
contrast, in the hindsight scenario, 70% of the respondents found
the invention obvious. While not quite as large as the difference in
obviousness Professor Mandel found, these initial results
essentially duplicate his findings.
judicial decisions, made with necessarily imperfect information, achieved that result. For a
discussion of this and related issues, see text accompanying notes 220-28, infra.
48 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
49 See infra Part IV.D.
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Having replicated Professor Mandel's results, we then created
two additional scenarios in an attempt to explore the
informational role hindsight seems to play. In our third scenario,
we presented the respondents with the same prior art and the
same problem to be solved as in the first two scenarios. We then
told the respondents that the problem had been solved, as in the
hindsight scenario. However, rather than tell the respondents the
solution directly, we offered the respondents four possible
solutions and told them that only one of them was the real
solution, while the other three were never developed or patented.
After presenting the four possible solutions, of which only one was
the real solution, we then asked if each solution would have been
obvious. In this "imperfect hindsight" scenario, only 38% of the
respondents found the correct solution obvious. This 38% is not
statistically different from the 48% that found the invention
obvious in the foresight scenario. Thus, mere knowledge that a
solution was found, while a form of hindsight, does not appear
sufficient to create the hindsight difference that Professor Mandel
identified.
In our fourth and final scenario, we presented a fourth group of
respondents with the same prior art and the same problem to be
solved. We then asked the respondents to write a few lines to
describe briefly how they thought the inventor might solve the
problem. In other words, we tried to get the respondents to put
themselves into the shoes of a person of ordinary skill in the art
and think about the problem and how it might be solved. Rather
than merely listen passively, we encouraged the respondents to
engage actively with the problem. We then followed the pattern of
the third scenario: present the respondents with four possible
solutions, tell them that only one of them was the real solution
while the other three were never developed or patented, and then
ask if each was obvious.
In this "imperfect hindsight with
engagement" scenario, 58% of respondents found the correct
solution obvious.
Importantly, this 58% is statistically
indistinguishable from the 70% who found the invention obvious in
the hindsight scenario.
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The results from this final scenario raise real questions
regarding the very existence of Professor Mandel's supposed
hindsight bias. Of all the scenarios, this final scenario, in our
opinion, comes closest to the information set likely to be available
at trial on obviousness issues, and given our attempt to encourage
engagement, we believe it also comes closest to the socially optimal
obviousness outcome. Given that the obviousness outcome in this
final scenario is statistically indistinguishable from the outcome in
the hindsight scenario, we find no basis for suggesting that the
availability of hindsight information, as Professor Mandel defines
it, biases obviousness outcomes. To the contrary, our results
suggest that the availability of this sort of hindsight information
helps our survey respondents make the obviousness determination
more accurately by providing them with information that more
closely parallels the information that would have been available to
a person having ordinary skill in the art. This, after all, was the
point of the fourth scenario: trying to get the respondents to
engage with the problem and act as if they were persons of
ordinary skill in the art. That the obviousness results are
statistically indistinguishable between the hindsight and
engagement scenarios suggests that perfect hindsight achieves the
same effect as engagement. Under this interpretation, perfect
hindsight does not create bias. Rather, it improves accuracy,
bringing actual obviousness outcomes closer to the socially optimal
outcome by enabling those without skill in an art to judge an
invention's obviousness as if they had such skill.
While we find this to be a perfectly workable explanation for
our results, we acknowledge that it is not the only possibility. Yet,
at the very least, our results definitively reject Professor Mandel's
conclusion that hindsight bias is invariably present in obviousness
determinations. As a result, we need not embrace an easier-tosatisfy obviousness standard for fear that hindsight bias will lead,
in any event, to over-enforcement of whatever obviousness
standard we adopt.
This Article explores these issues in turn. We begin with a brief
history of the nonobviousness doctrine and present the results
from our analysis of the role obviousness has played in explaining
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patentee losses in appellate patent litigation. As part of this, we
examine the Supreme Court's decision in KSR InternationalCo. v.
Teleflex, Inc. and its impact on obviousness determinations. We
then place obviousness into a policy framework and explain its role
in a sensible patent system. Having done so, we then discuss the
use of surveys and simulations to explore the role of hindsight in
obviousness determinations. We begin with Professor Mandel's
work, exploring his key conclusions and identifying some concerns
we have with his approach. We then present our work in the same
area, explain the reasons behind our additional scenarios, and
explore what our results mean for the use of hindsight and the
presence of hindsight bias in the patent system.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF OBVIOUSNESS
A. OBVIOUSNESS: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

Until the 1952 Patent Act, the patent statutes expressly
required only novelty and utility for patentability. Nevertheless,
in the middle of the nineteenth century, courts added a third
requirement. Known as invention until its codification in 1952
and as nonobviousness since its codification, this third
requirement asks that an invention represent not only some
advance over the prior art but a substantial advance.
We usually trace the nonobviousness doctrine's genesis to the
Supreme Court's decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.50 In that
case, the plaintiffs sued for infringement of their patent on an
improved door knob, where the improvement consisted of the use
of potter's clay or porcelain for the knob rather than one of the
theretofore traditional materials, such as wood or metal. 5 1 Each of
the elements of the invention-the clay knob, the shank and
spindle, and the dovetail cavity used to connect the shank and
spindle to the knob-was known in the prior art, but the patentees

50 52 U.S. 248 (1850).

5 Id. at 264.
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were the first to combine those elements.5 2 In presenting the case
to the jury, the plaintiffs requested the following jury instruction:
although the clay knob, in the form in which it was
patented, may have been before known and used, and
also the shank and spindle by which it is attached may
have been before known and used, yet if such shank
and spindle had never before been attached in this
mode to a knob of potter's clay, and it required skill
and invention to attach the same to a knob of this
description, so that they would be firmly united, and
make a strong and substantial article, and which,
when thus made, would become an article much better
and cheaper than the knobs made of metal or other
materials, the patent was valid, and the plaintiffs
53
would be entitled to recover.
The trial court rejected the plaintiffs' proposed instruction and
instead instructed the jury that:
if knobs of the same form and for the same purposes as
that claimed by the patentees, made of metal or other
material, had been before known and used; and if the
spindle and shank, in the form used by them, had been
before known and used, and had been attached to the
metallic knob by means of a cavity in the form of
dovetail and infusion of melted metal, the same as the
mode claimed by the patentees, in the attachment of
the shank and spindle to their knob; and the knob of
clay was simply the substitution of one material for
another, the spindle and shank being the same as
before in common use, and also the mode of connecting
them by dovetail to the knob the same as before in
common use, and no more ingenuity or skill required
to construct the knob in this way than that possessed
52 Id.

53 Id.
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by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business,
the patent was invalid, and the plaintiffs were not
54
entitled to a verdict.
On these instructions, the jury returned a verdict for the
defendant, and the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the
instruction inaccurately set forth the law.
On appeal, the
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the substitution of one
material, whether clay or porcelain, in the knob for the more
traditional metal or wood, in the absence of something more,
55
lacked the necessary ingenuity or invention to warrant a patent.
As the Court wrote:
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old
method of fastening the shank and the knob were
required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain
knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business, there was an absence of
that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute
essential elements of every invention. In other words,
the improvement is the work of the skilful mechanic,
not that of the inventor. 56
Through the use of the word "inventor," the Court tied this
third requirement for patentability to the constitutional language
in Article I, section 8, clause 8, authorizing Congress to grant
exclusive rights "to Authors and Inventors."5 7
Following
Hotchkiss, the courts for the next hundred years struggled to
define whether an advance was sufficient in any case to constitute
an invention and hence represented the constitutionally required
work of an inventor. 58 In 1941, the standard reached its rhetorical
54 Id. at 264-65.

5 Id. at 266 ("The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention.").
56

Id. at 267.

57 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (' The Congress shall have Power... [tlo promote the

Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
58SSee, e.g., Toledo Pressed Steel Co. v. Standard Parts, Inc., 307 U.S. 350, 356 (1939)

58
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high point. In Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp.,59 the Court began by reiterating the invention requirement:
"Under the [patent] statute, the device must not only be 'new and
useful', it must also be an 'invention' or 'discovery'." 60 In an
attempt to elaborate on the distinction between the work of the
"skillful mechanic" and that of the "inventor," the Court then
suggested an alternate verbal formulation: "the new device,
however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius,
61
not merely the skill of the calling."

(denying a patent for improvements to an outdoor burner used for warning signals as
merely combining two older devices); Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Halliburton, 306 U.S. 550, 562
(1939) (denying a patent for slight improvements to the method and apparatus for testing
productivity of oil wells for want of invention); Textile Mach. Works v. Louis Hirsch Textile
Mach., Inc., 302 U.S. 490, 498 (1938) (holding that regardless of novelty or commercial
success, a new addition to a knitting machine was foreseeable and therefore failed to meet
the inventiveness requirement of patentability); Altoona Publix Theatres v. Am. Tri-Ergon
Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 486 (1935) (denying a patent for the addition of a fly-wheel to a
phonogram as an improvement requiring mere skill and not invention, regardless of the
improvement's utility); Elec. Cable Joint Co. v. Brooklyn Edison Co., 292 U.S. 69, 79 (1934)
(denying a patent for improvements to the protective covering on electric cable joints for
want of inventiveness); Saranac Auto. Mach. Corp. v. Wirebounds Patents Co., 282 U.S.
704, 713 (1931) (overturning a patent for a method for making box blanks that did not differ
substantially from the prior art familiar in the field); Powers-Kennedy Contracting Corp. v.
Concrete Mixing & Conveying Co., 282 U.S. 175, 186 (1930) (holding certain improvements
to the method and apparatus for concrete treatment and transportation as merely
combining elements of prior art in the field and therefore not patentable); Concrete
Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 282 U.S. 177, 185 (1925) (denying a patent for improvements
resulting from the natural application of mechanical skill in the field of concrete);
Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1885) (ruling that adding a new valve system to
a water closet failed for lack of inventiveness to meet the standard for patentability); Morris
v. McMillin, 112 U.S. 244, 248 (1884) (observing that improvements that are the natural
and obvious advance in the natural progress of a product do not meet the standard required
for a patent); Phillips v. Detroit, 111 U.S. 604, 608 (1884) (holding that minor changes to a
well-known pavement construction method lacked the inventiveness required for a patent);
Slawson v. Grand St. R.R. Co., 107 U.S. 649, 654 (1883) (holding that the adding of an
additional pane of glass to a fare-box lacked the requisite invention to satisfy the standard
for a patentable improvement); Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1875) (denying
a patent for a slight improvement on the handle of a pencil that only slightly modified the
form of the tool); Hicks v. Kelsey, 85 U.S. 670, 674 (1873) (denying a patent for the mere
substitution of one material for another in the building of a wagon-reach axle).
59 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
60 Id. at 90 (citation omitted).
61 Id. at 91.
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In 1952, Congress enacted the present patent statute and, for
62
the first time, codified this third substantive requirement.
Rather than retain the "inventor" or "invention" language,
however, Congress phrased the requirement in terms of whether
the claimed invention "would have been obvious at the time [it]
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains."63 In the statutory language, Congress
expressly stated that an invention could be obvious even though it
was new 64 and also expressly directed courts to base the
obviousness determination on "the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art."65 In the final
sentence, Congress seemed to step away from Cuno Engineering's
rhetorical flourish, stating: "Patentability shall not be negatived
by the manner in which the invention was made." 66 Thus, even if
the result of plodding and steady progress, rather than a flash of
creative genius, an invention could be nonobvious.
In 1966, the Court gave the statutory nonobviousness
requirement its first definitive interpretation in Graham v. John
Deere Co. of Kansas City.67 In interpreting the provision, the
Court began by articulating the requirement's purpose.68 Patents
are a form of monopoly, the Court explained, and so there is a
need, as Thomas Jefferson once wrote, for "drawing a line between
the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an
exclusive patent, and those which are not."69 In the Court's view,
"[t]he inherent problem was to develop some means of weeding out
those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for
the inducement of a patent."7 0 The Hotchkiss condition solved this
problem by separating the trivial advances-the work of the
62 Act of July 14, 1952, Pub. L. No. 83-593, 66 Stat. 722, 798 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 103 (2006)).
63 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
64 See id. ("A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title ... "(emphasis added)).
65 Id.
66

Id.

67

383 U.S. 1 (1966).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 11.

68
69
70
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"skillful mechanic" that would be brought forth even without the
inducement of a patent-from the substantial advances-the work
71
of an "inventor" that would not occur but for a patent.
The Court then rejected suggestions "that the first sentence of
§ 103 was intended to sweep away judicial precedents and to lower
the level of patentability." 72 Instead of changing the level of
patentability, the Court held that "the section was intended
merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the
Hotchkiss condition. 7 3
Having set forth the purpose and background of the
nonobviousness requirement, the Court then articulated a threepart inquiry for resolving the issue.7 4 First, the fact-finder must
determine the scope and content of the prior art.75 Second, the
fact-finder must ascertain the differences between the prior art
and the patent claims at issue. 76 Third, the fact-finder must
resolve the level of skill in the prior art. 77 Once the fact-finder
resolves these preliminary factual inquiries, the judge must
determine as a matter of law whether the differences represent an
obvious or nonobvious advance over the prior art.78 In resolving
that issue, a court may also consider "[s]uch secondary
considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
79
failure of others, etc."
Three years later, in Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement
Salvage Co.,8° the Court returned to the nonobviousness
requirement. The patent at issue, as in the Hotchkiss case, took
existing elements from the prior art, in this case the prior art of
paving, including a radiant-heat burner and the equipment for
spreading and shaping asphalt, and combined them on one

71
72
73

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.

74 Id.
75

Id.

Id.
77 Id.
76

Id.
Id. at 17-18.
- 396 U.S. 57 (1969).

78

79
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chassis. 8 ' The Court held that the patent claims were invalid for

obviousness.8 2 In doing so, the Court reasoned that "[t]he
combination of putting the burner together with the other
elements in one machine, though perhaps a matter of great
convenience, did not produce a 'new or different function,'" nor
any "synergistic result."8

3

It was therefore obvious.

And given

that it merely combined existing elements from the prior art, the
invention's commercial success or the fact that it filled a long-felt
need could not establish invention or nonobviousness.8 4 As the
Court wrote: "It is, however, fervently argued that the combination
filled a long felt want and has enjoyed commercial success. But
those matters 'without invention will not make patentability.' "85
In short, the secondary factors were secondary. If a comparison of
the claims to the prior art revealed only such slight differences
that obviousness was plain, then the secondary factors could not
establish invention that was otherwise lacking.
In 1976, the Court reiterated these points in Sakraida v. Ag
Pro, Inc.8 6 In Sakraida, the patent claimed, in essence, a barnwashing mechanism consisting of a tank filled with water, an
appropriately sloped floor, and drains. 87 In the patent, the tank
would suddenly release its water in order to wash animal waste
down the drain.88 As in Hotchkiss, each of the elements of the
patented invention was found in the prior art, but the patentee
claimed that he was the first to combine them to create an
effective barn-washing device.8 9 The Court held that the patent
claims were obvious.9o Although the Court acknowledged that the
patentee's combination of the elements produced "a more striking
result than in previous combinations," the Court nonetheless

81 Id. at 58.

Id. at 62-63.
83 Id. at 60-61 (citation omitted).
4 Id.
85 Id. at 61 (quoting A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 153 (1950)).
86 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
87 Id. at 275-77.
82

88

Id. at 277.

89 Id.

90 Id. at 282-83.
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insisted that the combination failed to produce a "synergistic"
result.91 Rather, "this patent simply arranges old elements with
each performing the same function it had been known to
perform." 92 In the end, "[t]hough doubtless a matter of great
convenience, producing a desired result in a cheaper and faster
way, and enjoying commercial success, Dairy Establishment 'did
not produce a "new or different function" . . . within the test of
validity of combination patents.' These desirable benefits 'without
invention will not make patentability.'-93
While this trilogy established clear guidelines and set a high
bar for satisfying the nonobviousness requirement, their influence
proved short-lived. In 1982, Congress created the Federal Circuit
and gave it largely exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent
appeals. 94 Before the creation of the Federal Circuit, patent
litigation followed the usual course through the federal courts. A
patentee sued in any federal district court with venue and
personal jurisdiction over the alleged infringer. Appeals from
patent infringement litigation went to the relevant regional circuit
court of appeals. With the advent of the Federal Circuit, however,
essentially all appeals from patent litigation went to the Federal
Circuit rather than regional courts of appeals.
While the regional circuits largely shared the Court's perception
of patents as potentially undesirable monopolies and therefore
vigorously enforced the nonobviousness requirement, 95 the Federal
Circuit did not. Rather, it viewed patents as simply a desirable
form of property. 96 Almost immediately, it set about rewriting the
nonobviousness requirement to make it easier to satisfy.
91 Id.
92

Id. at 282.

93 Id. at 282-83 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting A. & P. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 153 (1950)).
94 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 37
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1275 (2006)).
95 See Lunney, supra note 37, at 380.
96 See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("Infringement having been established, it is contrary to the laws of property, of which the
patent law partakes, to deny the patentee's right to exclude others from use of his
property."); In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574, 1578 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (distinguishing the
meaning of monopoly in patent and antitrust cases); Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indust.
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With respect to patents claiming a combination of prior art
elements, the Federal Circuit simply rejected the Court's
reasoning in Anderson's-Black Rock and Sakraida. There is no
meaningful category of "combination" patents, the Federal Circuit
insisted, and no "synergism" or "synergistic result" requirement in
the statute. 97 As Chief Judge Markey explained:
A requirement for "synergism" or a "synergistic effect"
is nowhere found in the statute .... The reference to
a "combination patent" is equally without support in
the statute. . . Reference to "combination" patents is,
moreover, meaningless.
Virtually all patents are
"combination patents," if by that label one intends to
describe patents having claims to inventions formed of
a combination of elements. 98
Yet even if one accepts Chief Judge Markey's argument, that
still leaves the question as to when a combination of prior art
elements is nonobvious. In 1984, the Federal Circuit answered
that question in ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore
Hospital.99 The patent at issue in ACS Hospital Systems claimed a
rental television system. 100 Finding that the claimed invention
consisted of nothing more than a combination of three well-known
prior art elements operating in an entirely traditional manner, the
trial court held that the invention was obvious. 10 1 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit rejected the trial court's analysis as "no more than
Prods., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 1558-59 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (disapproving of the term monopoly in
patent cases as pejorative); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The essence of
all property is the right to exclude...."); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725
F.2d 1350, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (distinguishing illegal antitrust monopolies from patent
monopolies); Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1574 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(criticizing use of the term monopoly); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548
(Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[A] patent is a form of property right, and the right to exclude recognized
in a patent is but the essence of the concept of property.'); Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron
Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("A patent, under the statute, is property.").
97 Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
98 Id.
99 732 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
100 Id. at 1574.
101 Id. at 1575.
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hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention,"'10 2 and held
that "[o]bviousness cannot be established by combining the
teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention, absent
some teaching or suggestion supporting the combination. Under
section 103, teachings of references can be combined only if there
is some suggestion or incentive to do so."103 In the years following
ACS Hospital Systems, the Federal Circuit consistently required
some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to be present in the prior
art before elements from different prior art references could be
combined.104

In addition to rejecting the Court's approach to combining prior
art references, the Federal Circuit was also dissatisfied with the
Court's approach to the so-called "secondary considerations."
Although the Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City
had acknowledged that "[s]uch secondary considerations as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,
etc. ... may have

relevancy"

as

"indicia of obviousness

or

nonobviousness,"' 0 5 the Court consistently limited the role of these
secondary considerations. As Anderson's-Black Rock and Sakraida
reflect, the secondary considerations were insufficient to "tip the
scales of patentability" where the invention as whole otherwise
10 6
appeared obvious.
Again, however, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the Court's
approach.
As Chief Judge Markey explained, evidence of
secondary considerations is often "the most probative and cogent
evidence in the record" and that it "must always when present be
considered."'0 7 In keeping with this more central role, the Federal
102

Id.

103

Id.

at 1577.

104

See, e.g., Thomas L. Irving et al., A Year in Review: The Federal Circuit's Patent

Decisions of 1993, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1314-15 (1974) (describing the Federal Circuit's
test for obviousness).
105

383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).

106 Id.

at 36; see supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text (discussing Anderson's-Black

Rock and Sakraida).
107 Stratoflex Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also
Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(reversing finding of obviousness for failure to consider evidence of secondary
considerations); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1555 (Fed. Cir.
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Circuit renamed this type of evidence. No longer would it be
known as "secondary considerations"; under the Federal Circuit, it
08
became "objective evidence of nonobviousness."'
Like the Federal Circuit's substitution of its own suggestion test
for the Court's synergy approach, the Federal Circuit's increased
reliance on secondary considerations tends to reduce directly the
likelihood that a litigated patent will be found obvious. As
Professor Edmund Kitch warned more than forty years ago, an
increased reliance on secondary considerations, such as
commercial success, to resolve questions of patent validity almost
necessarily leads to a "rule that all patents that are litigated
should be held valid." 10 9 As Professor Kitch explained, "it is
unlikely that patents that are not commercially successful will be
brought to litigation."" 0 As a result, to the extent that commercial
success becomes an important factor in determining a patent's
validity, the very fact that the patent is worth litigating should
establish its validity.
Despite the fact that the Federal Circuit overlooked, rewrote,
and in some cases expressly rejected the Court's interpretation of
the nonobviousness requirement, the Court for twenty-five years
refused all invitations to reexamine the Federal Circuit's doctrinal
developments."' As a result, the Federal Circuit's weakening of
the nonobviousness requirement became, without the benefit of
either congressional or Supreme Court action, de facto the new law
of the patent land.

1983) (same).
108 E.g., Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 919 F.2d 720, 725 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
109 Kitch, supra note 40, at 333.
110 Id.
1I Between the Federal Circuit's creation in 1982 and the Court's decision in KSR
InternationalCo. v. Teleflex, Inc. in 2007, the only Federal Circuit obviousness decision the
Court reviewed was Dennison ManufacturingCo. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986). In
that case, after a bench trial, the district court held that the patent claims at issue were
obvious. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court without explaining which parts of
the obviousness determination were factual and hence subject to review only for clear error
and which parts of the determination were legal. After granting certiorari, the Court,
without the benefit of briefing or oral argument, summarily reversed the Federal Circuit.
In a per curiam opinion, the Court directed the Federal Circuit to explain whether the clear
error rule insulated all or part of the trial court's obviousness decision. Id. at 811.
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B. THE COURT STEPS IN: KSR V. TELEFLEX

Having rewritten the nonobviousness doctrine to its
satisfaction, the Federal Circuit applied it, in an entirely routine
fashion, in Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR InternationalCo. 112 The patent
claims at issue in KSR concerned an adjustable pedal assembly for
use with automobiles with electronically controlled engines. The
patent claimed a particular combination of three elements, already
well-known in the prior art, including a support bracket, an
adjustable pedal assembly, and an electronic pedal position sensor.
Rather than attach the sensor to the pedal, as in the prior art,
where the pedal's movement could lead to chafing of the wires
connecting the sensor to the engine, the patent claim at issue
113
placed the sensor on the nonmoving support bracket.
On summary judgment, the trial court held that the patent
claim at issue was obvious. In the trial court's view, the patent
claim represented a simple combination of prior art elements. The
trial court acknowledged that it was bound by the Federal Circuit's
teaching, suggestion, or motivation test but believed that the prior
art contained sufficient suggestion to combine the prior art
elements in the manner set forth in Teleflex's patent claim. 1 4 The
trial court specifically referred to a prior art patent, the Smith
patent, that stated that "the pedal assemblies must not precipitate
any motion in the connecting wires themselves.""6 From this, the
trial court inferred a sufficient motivation to move the sensor from
the moving pedal assembly, as in the prior art, to the nonmoving
support bracket, as in the patent claim at issue, in order to
prevent motion in the connecting wires. Although the patentee
touted his invention's commercial success, the trial court found the
"evidence of commercial success insufficient to overcome
116
Defendant's clear and convincing evidence of obviousness."

119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
KSR., 550 U.S. at 407-10.
114 Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 594 (E.D. Mich. 2003), reu'd, 119 F.
App'x 282, rev'd, 550 U.S. 378.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 596.
112
113
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On appeal, a panel of the Federal Circuit reversed. 117 Although
the panel acknowledged that each of the elements of the patent
claim were readily found in the prior art, the panel insisted that
the prior art failed to provide the necessary motivation to combine
those elements in the particular manner claimed. 118 In its opinion,
the panel began by laying out broadly the sort of teaching,
suggestion, or motivation that would suffice to combine elements
from separate prior art references, assuring us:
The reason, suggestion, or motivation to combine prior
art references may be found explicitly or implicitly: 1)
in the prior art references themselves; 2) in the
knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art that
certain references, or disclosures in those references,
are of special interest or importance in the field; or 3)
from the nature of the problem to be solved, "leading
inventors to look to references relating to possible
solutions to that problem."1 1 9
Yet, as was typical for the Federal Circuit, the panel's application
of the teaching, suggestion, or motivation test proved far narrower
and less flexible than this initial statement might suggest. In the
panel's view, the prior art's suggestion to minimize movement in
order to reduce wire chafing was directed at reducing wire chafing,
120
not at reducing the size and complexity of pedal assemblies.
Because it was aimed at a different problem, it could not provide
the necessary motivation to move the sensor from pedal to
bracket. 121 The panel dismissed another key prior art reference,
the Asano patent, that contained each element of the claim at
issue-except the sensor-for a similar reason. It too was directed

117

KSR, 119 F. App'x at 282.

118 Id.

119 Id.

at 288-89.

at 285 (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d

654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
120 Id. at 288.
121

Id.
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at solving a different problem, so it also could not provide the
122
necessary motivation.
There was nothing particularly unusual or surprising in the
panel's narrow and rigid reading of the teaching, suggestion, or
motivation test. To the contrary, it was entirely typical of the
manner in which the Federal Circuit applied the test. And the
panel certified the decision as suitable for resolution without a
published opinion.
123
Yet on June 26, 2006, the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
and on April 30, 2007, it reversed. 124 In its opinion, the Court
began with a gentle reminder to the Federal Circuit that the
Court's earlier decisions in Anderson's-Black Rock and Sakraida
remained valid and binding law on the circuit court. 25 Quoting
from Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Corp., the Court emphasized that
[n]either the enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in
Graham disturbed this Court's earlier instructions
concerning the need for caution in granting a patent
based on the combination of elements found in the
prior art. For over a half century, the Court has held
that a "patent for a combination which only unites old
elements with no change in their respective
functions.., obviously withdraws what already is
known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes
the resources available to skillful men.' 26
The Court then went on to note the "synergism" standard set forth
in Anderson's-Black Rock, 27 and to derive from its earlier cases
the following principle: "The combination of familiar elements

122

Id.

124

KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 548 U.S. 902, 902 (2006).
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007).

125

Id. at 407.

123

Id. at 415-16 (quoting Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340
U.S. 147, 152-53 (1950)).
126
127

Id. at 417.
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according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no
128
more than yield predictable results."
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that "a patent composed
of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating
that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior
art."'1 29 The Court further recognized the truth of Chief Judge
Markey's observation in Stratoflex,130 and admitted that
"inventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks
long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity
'
will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known."''
Moving to the case before it, the Court recognized that the
presence or absence of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the
prior art may prove relevant in trying to determine whether any
particular combination of prior art elements is obvious.' 32 But it
or
rejected any rigid rule that such a teaching, suggestion, 133
found.
be
can
obviousness
before
motivation must be present
The Court further rejected the Federal Circuit's overly narrow and
unduly circumscribed sense for the sort of teaching, suggestion, or
It is not
motivation sufficient to establish obviousness. 3 4
necessary for the prior art to be directed at solving the same
problem as the patented claim for it to provide the necessary
motivation to combine, the Court held, for two reasons. First,
patent claims are not typically limited to the problem they intend
to solve. 135 Teleflex's patent, for example, claimed a particular
arrangement of pedal, support bracket, and sensor, whether
undertaken to reduce the size and complexity of the pedal
assembly, to reduce wire chafing, or for some other reason.
Second, whatever the original or primary purpose of a given piece
of prior art, persons having ordinary skill in the art will often

Id. at 416.
Id. at 418.
130 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
131 KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-19.
128
129

132

Id.

134

Id. at 419.
Id. at 420.

136

Id.

133
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recognize that the prior art solves other problems as well. 136 For
these reasons, the Court held that "any need or problem known in
the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the
patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the
137
manner claimed."'
Finally, the Court rejected the longstanding Federal Circuit
rule that "a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by
showing that the combination of elements was 'obvious to try.' "138
To the contrary, "obvious to try" can establish obviousness "[w]hen
there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and
139
there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions."'
Applying these principles, the Court held the patent claim at
issue obvious--"well within the grasp of a person of ordinary skill
in the relevant art."'140 Warning the Federal Circuit that not all
patents are good patents, the Court cautioned that granting
patents for such ordinary innovation-innovation that would likely
occur even without the inducement of a patent-"might stifle,
rather than promote, the progress of useful arts."''
C. KSR'S IMPACT

Despite its occasional pretensions to being the "Supreme Court
of Patents,"'142 the Federal Circuit is well aware that it is not.
Even before the Court issued its decision in KSR, its decision to
grant certiorari in the case influenced the Federal Circuit's
approach to the obviousness issue. Only a few months after the
Court granted certiorari, the Federal Circuit, whether reading the
tea leaves or attempting to persuade the Court to leave well
enough alone, emphasized that the teaching, suggestion, or

Id.
Id.
138 Id. at 421 (citation omitted).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 427.
141 Id.
142 See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REv. 387, 387 ("[Tlhe Federal Circuit ... has become the de facto supreme court of patents.").
136
137
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motivation test was not a rigid doctrine. Thus, in October 2006,
Chief Judge Michel explained on behalf of the Federal Circuit that:
In contrast to the characterization of some
commentators, the suggestion test is not a rigid
categorical rule. The motivation need not be found in
the references sought to be combined, but may be
found in any number of sources, including common
knowledge, the prior art as a whole, or the nature of

the problem itself. 143
Later in the same opinion, Chief Judge Michel insisted that "[o]ur
suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible and not only permits,
but requires, consideration of common knowledge and common
144
sense."
After the Court issued its KSR opinion, numerous Federal
Circuit opinions cited the case and relied on its reasoning. For
example, only a few months after KSR was decided, the Federal
Circuit held invalid for obviousness a patent on an electronic
145
learning device intended to teach children to read phonetically.
In doing so, the court relied on KSR's reasoning that the common
sense alone of a person having ordinary skill in the art could
46
provide the necessary motivation to combine prior art elements.'
A few years after that, in Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Barr
Laboratories, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court's
conclusion that a patent on the formulation of a daily oral
contraceptive was obvious. 147 In doing so, the court relied on the
KSR Court's reasoning that "obvious to try" could establish
obviousness, at least where the prior art provides a reasonable

143 DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
144 Id. at 1367; see also Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
2006) ("There is flexibility in our obviousness jurisprudence because a motivation may be
found implicitly in the prior art. We do not have a rigid test that requires an actual
teaching to combine .... ").
145 Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
146 Id. at 1161.
147 575 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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expectation of success among "a finite number of identified,
predictable solutions."'148 And two years after that, in Tokai Corp.
v. Easton Enterprises, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed a district
court's holding that three patents on automatic safety mechanisms
for utility lighters were invalid for obviousness. 149 Again, the court
relied extensively on KSR's reasoning, holding that where the art
lends itself to "identified, predictable solutions," each of the
elements exists in the prior art, and an explicit need in the prior
art provides the necessary motivation to combine the elements, the
50
resulting invention is obvious.
In addition to this anecdotal evidence of KSR's impact, an
empirical examination of appellate patent decisions establishes the
To examine this issue, we
difference that KSR has made.
conducted an empirical investigation of all appellate decisions
arising from patent infringement litigation in six pre-Federal
Circuit time periods, beginning with the period 1944-1946,151 and
since January 1, 1984. As has become the practice, we conducted a
population, rather than a sample, study and included all
intermediate appellate utility patent infringement decisions that
were available in the "Federal Circuit-US Court of Appeals"
LEXIS database for the post-Federal Circuit periods or in the
"Federal Court Cases, Combined" LEXIS database for the preFederal Circuit periods. After identifying cases in the relevant
population, we separated decisions into three categories: (1)
"success"; (2) "failure"; or (3) "non-final" resolutions where a patent
holder neither succeeded nor failed. "Success" was defined as a
decision where a patent holder obtained preliminary or permanent
injunctive relief or damages, on any patent claim at issue in the
litigation. "Failure" was defined as a decision where the appellate
court either denied preliminary injunctive relief or finally resolved
all claims of patent infringement and no claim of patent
148

Id.

632 F.3d 1358, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1371-72 (quoting KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)).
151 The six time periods were: (1) 1944-1946; (2) 1955-1957; (3) 1964-1965; (4) 1966-1967;
(5) 1975-1976; and (6) 1981-1982. For the study, I selected the six periods to give a
representative sample for each decade, with an additional period bracketing the Court's
decision in Graham v.John Deere & Co. of Kansas City.
149
150
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infringement in the case succeeded. The final category consisted of
"non-final" decisions, where a patent holder did not succeed in
obtaining the relief sought, but the claims of infringement were
not finally rejected by the court. Rather, the appellate court
reversed or vacated the ruling of the district court on one aspect or
another and remanded the case for further proceedings.
To account for the possibility of selection bias in the population,
we then focused exclusively on the "failure" category. For this
category, we broke down the reasons why the patent claims failed
into the following categories: (1) the patent claims were held
invalid or otherwise unenforceable; (2) the patent claims were held
obvious; (3) the patent claims were held not infringed; or (4) the
We then tracked the
patentee lost for some other reason.
percentage of cases in the failure category for which invalidity and
obviousness accounted. Figure 1 presents the results for four time
periods: (1) the pre-Federal Circuit era; (2) the pre-KSR Federal
Circuit era from 1984 through 2001; (3) the immediate pre-KSR
era from 2004 through 2006; and (4) the post-KSR era from 2008
through 2010.
Figure 1. Reasons for Losing: Percentage of Losses Due to
Invalidity or Unenforceability of Patent and Due to Obviousness
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As Figure 1 illustrates, obviousness was once far and away the
most important doctrine in patent law. During the pre-Federal
Circuit era studied, when a patentee lost on claims of patent
infringement, nearly 65% of the time it was due to a finding that
the patent claims at issue were obvious. Given that patentees lose
between 60% and 70% of the time on final resolutions at the
appellate level, 15 2 if we multiply the percentage of cases in which
patentees lost by the percentage where they lost due to
obviousness, we find that nearly half of all cases that were finally
resolved at the appellate level during the pre-Federal Circuit era
were resolved through a finding or conclusion that the patent
claim at issue was obvious.
In contrast, with the advent of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the
nonobviousness requirement became much easier to satisfy. From
1984 through 2001, when a patentee lost in the Federal Circuit,
obviousness was the reason in less than 15% of those losses. From
2004 through 2006, the period immediately preceding the grant of
certiorari in KSR, when a patentee lost in the Federal Circuit,
obviousness was the reason in only 7.5% of the losses, thus playing
a decisive role in less than 5% of the appellate cases in which
claims of patent infringement were resolved. Where obviousness
was once the single, most common reason a patentee lost, under
the Federal Circuit, noninfringement has become the dominant
153
explanation for patentee losses.
These results reveal that the Federal Circuit substantially
weakened the nonobviousness requirement. They conflict directly
with the results that Professors Petherbridge and Wagner and
Professor Cotropia reach in a pair of studies empirically examining
the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence. 1 54 Both of
these studies examine, inter alia, the rate at which the Federal
Circuit reaches a nonobviousness result where the issue of

152

See Lunney, supra note 27, at 12.

153

Id. at 15.

154 Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical
Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2007); Lee Petherbridge & R.
Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability:An Empirical Assessment of the Law of
Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051 (2007).
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75

obviousness is litigated. 16 5 Both find that the Federal Circuit
reaches a nonobvious result in less than 43% of the cases where
the issue is litigated. 15 6 Professors Petherbridge and Wagner tout
their finding as evidence that the Federal Circuit has not
weakened the nonobviousness requirement. 157 Professor Cotropia
makes a similar claim but acknowledges that his results may be
the result of selection bias and therefore admits that "any
inference into the strength of the nonobviousness requirement
from this data is weak."' 58

155Both papers also examine reversal rates on obviousness determinations. They predict
that a somewhat higher-than-normal reversal rate will accompany any change in the
obviousness standard. Cotropia, supra note 154, at 931; Petherbridge & Wagner, supra
note 154, at 2076. Finding no such change in reversal rates over the periods studied, they
both conclude that the Federal Circuit has not weakened or otherwise significantly changed
the obviousness standard. Cotropia, supranote 154, at 937; Petherbridge & Wagner, supra
note 154, at 2080. This aspect of their work suffers from three defects. First, an appellate
court can change a legal standard without reversals. In Stratoflex, Inc., for example, Chief
Judge Markey expressly rejected the Court's reasoning in Anderson's-Black Rock and
Sakraida. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. He significantly weakened the
nonobviousness requirement, yet to avoid the possibility of Court review, he specifically
affirmed the district court's finding of obviousness. Second, even if a high reversal rate
accompanies a change in legal standards, both papers focus on the wrong time periods.
Most of the changes in the obviousness standard occurred at the outset of the Federal
Circuit in 1983 and 1984. As Professor Lunney's work has shown, invalidity was the reason
why a patent claim failed in approximately 80% of the cases in 1981-1982, yet by 19861987, it was the reason in less than 40% of the cases. See Lunney, supra note 27, at 14-15.
So if there is a high reversal rate to be found, presumably we should look in the 1983-1985
time period. Unfortunately, Professors Petherbridge and Wagner's data does not begin
until January 1, 1990, and Professor Cotropia's does not begin until January 1, 2002.
Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 154, at 2071; Cotropia, supra note 154, at 924. Third,
reversal rates suffer from the same selection effects that drive success rates. Just as parties
will settle rather than litigate a case unless both sides have some equilibrium chance of
success, parties will settle rather than litigate an appeal unless there is again some given
chance of success. Both studies seem to assume that a higher reversal rate will arise
following a change in a legal standard because it will take time for parties and their lawyers
to adjust to the new legal standard. That is possible, but neither Petherbridge and Wagner
nor Cotropia explain how long that adjustment period will be. It seems extremely unlikely
that the reversal rate will remain high for fifteen or even four years following a change in a
legal standard, as these authors seem to assume.
156 Cotropia, supra note 154, at 934; Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 154, at 2087.
157 Petherbridge & Wagner, supranote 154, at 2088.
158 Cotropia, supranote 154, at 914.
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We believe that Professor Cotropia understates the problem.
159
It
Selection bias does not render the "inference ...weak."
renders any inference as to the strength of the nonobviousness
requirement drawn directly from the success rate for obviousness
claims at the Federal Circuit at best irrelevant and at worst-and
more likely-affirmatively misleading. Where obviousness is the
principal defense at issue, overall appellate success rates on that
issue tell us nothing about the strength or weakness of the
obviousness requirement. Rather, the average success rate merely
reflects the underlying considerations that lead parties to select a
case for resolution through litigation rather than settlement.
When we use appellate resolutions as our data set, we are
observing only those patent disputes that parties have chosen to
litigate rather than settle. Parties chose to litigate rather than
settle presumably because they have decided that, given their
chance of success, they have more to gain, or less to lose, by
litigating rather than by settling. For example, if both parties
know that one of the parties is virtually certain to lose, then often
it will make sense to settle accordingly and avoid the costs of
litigation. If the issues are close, or if litigation offers something
that cannot be obtained through settlement, then we should expect
that litigation is more likely. As a practical matter, these selection
effects tend to lead to an equilibrium success rate in decided cases.
In an earlier study, Professor Lunney showed that success rates
for
patentees has
remained
relatively
unchanged, at
approximately 30%, for more than sixty years beginning in the
1940s. 160
This appears to be the point at which, given the
potentially asymmetric stakes for the parties, 16 1 the parties'
relative preference for uncertainty, and the costs and benefits of
litigating, parties chose to litigate rather than settle.
When we examine success rates on obviousness or some other
central issue, we are not in fact examining whether there have been
changes in the obviousness standard but whether there have been
159

Id.

Lunney, supra note 27, at 10.
See id. at 12-13 (noting that "patent holders and alleged infringers calculate the value
of an injunction from radically different perspectives").
160

161
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changes in the strategic considerations that would lead a party to
litigate rather than settle. Assume, for example, that we have three
cases (or types of cases) in the litigation pipeline and that a 35%
success rate represents the equilibrium at which parties will choose
to litigate rather than settle. Under the present nonobviousness
standard, the patent at issue in the first case has a 50-50 chance of
being held not proven obvious; in the second case, the patent has a
35-65 chance on that issue; and in the third case, the patent has a
20-80 chance on that issue. If a 35% success rate represents the
appropriate equilibrium where-given asymmetric information,
disproportionate stakes, and relative preferences for risk and
uncertainty-litigating rather than settling will occur, then, under
the existing standard, the first case and others like it will settle, as
will the third case and others like it. Only the second case and
others with a similar probability of success will be litigated. As a
result, if we examine appellate decisions as Petherbridge and
Wagner and Cotropia do, when we add up all the nonobviousness
results, we find that the Federal Circuit upholds patents as
nonobvious in 35% of the cases. 16 2 If, as these cases are working
their way through the litigation pipeline, the Federal Circuit
weakened the nonobviousness standard to increase the chance of a
nonobviousness result by 15% for each of these three cases, then
Petherbridge and Wagner as well as Cotropia seem to assume
implicitly that the second case will still be the one litigated, but now
the success rate will go up from 35% to 50%. If that were to happen,
then we could add up success rates on obviousness from appellate
decisions and point to the higher success rate as evidence of a
weakening of the nonobviousness requirement. But that is not
what will happen. Instead, if the strategic considerations that drive
the parties' decision to litigate rather than settle remain
unchanged, then the overall success rate will remain unchanged.
What will change is that parties, facing the new nonobviousness
standard, will now settle the first and second cases (and others like
them) and will choose to litigate the third case (and others like it),
which now has a 35-65 chance of success on the nonobviousness

162

See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
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issue. As a result, examining appellate decisions and calculating
success rates on nonobviousness based upon litigated cases, we will
find that the Federal Circuit still upholds patents in 35% of the
litigated cases. The success rate on nonobviousness remains
unchanged even though the nonobviousness standard has changed,
because parties adapt to the new standard and settle or litigate
accordingly.163

In a previous paper, Professor Lunney showed that we can
account for selection effects and get a clearer picture of changes in
substantive doctrine when we use appellate decisions as our data
set by focusing on the subset of cases where a patent holder lost and
then examining the reason(s) why a patent holder lost. 164

By

focusing on obviousness as a fraction of those cases where a
patentee lost, we can effectively normalize our data. While parties
still select which cases to litigate rather than settle and which
issues to argue, those selection effects now help us identify the
relative importance of any given doctrine within the overall
structure of patent law and to track substantive doctrinal changes.
If a court weakens the nonobviousness requirement, making
obviousness much harder for a defendant to prove, then defendants
will emphasize other defenses, such as noninfringement, and we
should see obviousness account for fewer patent-holder losses
accordingly. By using this approach and thus accounting for
selection effects, we find a clear weakening of the nonobviousness
requirement under the Federal Circuit before KSR.
Using this approach, we find some recovery in the importance of
the nonobviousness doctrine following KSR, as one would
expect. 165 From 2008 through 2010, obviousness accounted for just
less than 20% of the losses patentees experienced. Compared to
the immediately preceding period of 2004 through 2006, this
163 Curiously, both papers acknowledge the presence of, and risks presented by, selection
bias, but both still tout their results as evidence that the Federal Circuit has not weakened
the nonobviousness requirement. See supra note 155.
164 Lunney, supranote 27, at 14-16.
165 We would be interested to see if the Petherbridge and Wagner and Cotropia
approaches find any similar effects from KSR. If selection effects are driving their results,
as we believe, then, at least after a transition period, we should expect to find no significant
changes in success or reversal rates using their approaches.
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represents a healthy rebound. Yet, despite the bump, obviousness
today accounts for only a small fraction of the losses for which it
accounted in the pre-Federal Circuit era and is no longer the
dominant doctrine it once was.
III. OBVIOUSNESS IN THEORY

The diminished vitality of the nonobviousness doctrine weakens
the ability of the patent system to encourage the full range of
potential innovations in the useful arts. Although there remains
an unfortunate level of confusion over the economic trade-offs
entailed in patent protection, the basic trade-off is simple: Because
patent law provides a largely uniform level of protection for
everything within its scope, expanding protection brings forth
additional innovation at the cost of overprotecting innovations that
would have been brought forth at some lower level of protection
(the "preexisting" innovations). 166 The trade-off is not between
incentives and access for any given innovation, nor between static
and dynamic efficiency more generally. 167 Rather, the trade-off is
between the marginal increase in social value the additional
innovations generate and the marginal decrease in social value
that arises from overprotecting (or further overprotecting) the
preexisting innovations. Within this framework, the question
becomes one of optimal mechanism design, given limited
information.
In any given art or technological field, there is the potential for
a wide range of innovations. At any given time, some advances are
E.g., Lunney, supra note 27, at 5-6, 64-67.
As Professor Lunney explained elsewhere:
Even where a regime of exclusive rights represents the best available
alternative for encouraging certain types of innovation, the social value of
an innovation will presumably be somewhat less if protected by a patent
than if its public good aspect could have been freely and fully exploited.
Yet, if providing patent protection ensures the creation of a desirable
information product and does so more efficiently than the plausible
alternatives, such as patent prizes or direct government subsidies, the fact
that the information product could have been more valuable still in the
absence of the patent's protection has little practical significance.
Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted).
166

167
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easy and may require little or no patent protection to bring them
forth. For these advances, the incentives that arise inherently in
markets operating against a background of enforceable contracts
and exclusive rights in real and personal property can provide the
necessary incentives to bring them forth. Whether arising through
lead-time advantages, reputational rents, or otherwise, ordinary
market incentives are sufficient, and for these advances no patent
protection is required. In contrast, other advances are more
difficult and may require some degree of encouragement beyond
that which contracts and traditional property rights alone will
provide. While a system of exclusive rights in such advances is not
the only available mechanism to provide the additional
encouragement necessary, in the presence of imperfect information
as to the costs, value, and best research paths to pursue to achieve
the desired advance, a system of exclusive rights, such as the set
patent law provides, may prove the best available alternative.
Yet, even for advances that require additional encouragement,
some may require only a little extra encouragement, while others
may require a great deal.
Indeed, for a given art, we can imagine some distribution of the
potential advances that could be brought forth as the level of
patent protection available increases, from no protection to the
maximum protection theoretically possible, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Possible Distribution of Inventions Available
Against Protection Required to Bring Them Forth

0f

Level of Protection Required
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If a regulator had perfect information regarding the potential
range of inventions and the level of protection required to bring
forth each and could enforce an individually tailored system of
rights for each, the regulator would provide each invention with
precisely that level of protection necessary to bring it forth and no
more. 168 But in the real world, regulators do not have such perfect
information and cannot realistically enforce a system of
individually tailored rights.
In the real world, a regulator may have little or no information
about the level of protection required to bring forth any given
invention but may know only the distribution of potential
innovations and the fraction of the distribution that any given
level of patent protection will bring forth.
Moreover, the
administrative costs associated with enforcing a regime of
individually tailored rights are also likely to prove prohibitive.
Facing such limited information and high administrative costs, the
regulator's optimal choice may be to provide some uniform level of
protection-whether none, some, or a lot-to each of the potential
inventions. This, historically, is what patent and copyright have
done. For the creative products they cover, each has provided a
largely uniform set of exclusive rights, for a largely uniform term,
to every invention or work that satisfied a given set of largely
uniform prerequisites.
With such a uniform system of rights, any given level of
protection will bring forth all of those advances that require that
level of protection or less to ensure the expectation of a nonnegative producer surplus from investing in the advance. If we
provide additional protection, so as to increase the expected rents
from investing in any given advance, that additional protection
will likely bring forth some additional advances.
However,
because protection is uniform, we will also provide that additional
protection to those advances that could have been brought forth
with less protection. This overprotection has a cost. Granting a
right to exclude with respect to an otherwise nonrivalrous good,
such as the information contained in a technological advance,
168 Of course, if these assumptions were satisfied, then the patent system would be "both
unnecessary and undesirable." Lunney, supra note 27, at 4.
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raises the prices associated with the information, increases
transaction costs associated with the use of the information, and
prevents others from putting the information to all of its highest
and best uses. 169 For these reasons, overprotection of any given
advance will limit the ability of others to take advantage of the
advance's nonrivalrous nature and will thereby decrease its social
value. Given these competing benefits and costs from extending
protection, in a system of uniform protection, we reach the optimal
level of protection when, for any additional increase in protection
provided, the marginal loss in social value from (further)
overprotecting preexisting advances exceeds the marginal gain in
social value associated with the additional advances that broader
protection would bring forth.
Information costs and the resulting uniformity of protection
thus impose two costs. First, we have the familiar deadweight
losses and other costs associated with overprotecting those
innovations that could have been brought forth with less
protection.
Second, given the trade-off between encouraging
additional advances and maximizing the social value associated
with the preexisting advances, an optimal system of uniform
protection will almost invariably set the level of protection too low
to ensure the expected profitability, and hence existence, of the full
range of potential innovations.
A vibrant nonobviousness requirement can play a crucial role in
reducing both of these uniformity costs. If our regulator lacks
perfect information as to how much protection each advance
requires but can group the potential advances into rough
categories that require a given level of protection, the regulator
can use the nonobviousness requirement to tailor the protection
provided to that required for each such category. Assume, for
example, that the regulator has sufficient information to divide the
potential advances into two categories: easy and hard. As the
difficulty increases, we need more patent protection to bring forth
additional innovations, but the regulator can only provide a single
169

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A

CONNECTED WORLD 209-11 (2001) (discussing costs of patent protection in the Internet
context).
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uniform set of rights for each. In this situation, the regulator faces
a choice between (1) providing sufficient protection to bring forth
the more difficult innovations but overprotecting the easier
innovations, and (2) providing sufficient protection to bring forth
the easier innovations without overprotecting them but failing to
provide sufficient protection to bring forth the more difficult
innovations at all.
In the absence of a tailoring mechanism, these are the only
Neither is optimal, as each either
choices available.
underprotects, and thus fails to ensure some desired innovations,
or overprotects, and thus reduces the social value of some desired
innovations, or, in the real world, does both. With sufficient
information, vigorous enforcement of the nonobviousness
requirement can help us avoid this undesirable result. Facing an
otherwise uniform term of protection and a uniform set of
exclusive rights for all four categories of advance, a regulator can
nonetheless provide each category with the right level of patent
protection by using the nonobviousness requirement to create a
risk that any given patent will not in the end prove valid. For
risk-neutral patentees, 7 ° receiving a patent with a twenty-year
term and the exclusive right to "make[], use[], offer[ ] to sell, or
sell[ ]"171 the invention, but with a 50% chance that the patent will
be found invalid, has the same economic value as a patent with a
shorter term or a narrower set of rights and a 100% chance of
being found valid. 172 Thus, our regulator can give our easy
innovations a full set of patent rights, but with a high chance of
invalidity, while providing our hard innovations the same set of
patent rights, but with a low chance of invalidity. By doing so, the
regulator can tailor the level of patent protection effectively
provided to each type of innovation to the level of protection
necessary to bring those advances forth.
170 This point holds for risk-averse patentees as well. But a given risk of invalidity will
lead to a lower assessment of a patent's value for a risk-averse patentee than for a riskneutral patentee.
171 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
172 See Lunney, supra note 27, at 72-73 (comparing "expected rent" from a 50% chance of
validity with "expected rent" of a patent with a narrower scope); see generally Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, ProbabilisticPatents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (Spring 2005).
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For a range of innovations moving from exceptionally easy to
exceptionally hard, so long as our regulator can group the
potential advances appropriately, the regulator can create a risk
that a patent will be held obvious in order to create a rough match
between the level of protection needed to bring forth an innovation
and the level of protection effectively provided. The regulator can
thereby design a patent system that will both (1) not overprotect
the relatively easy advances and (2) provide sufficient
encouragement to the relatively difficult advances.
The question becomes whether courts have sufficient
information to group patented inventions into even such rough
The central role that
categories without undue mistakes.
nonobviousness once played in patent litigation suggests that
courts at one time believed that they could. Moreover, as an
economic matter, we have a pretty good sense of the sorts of
research and development investments that will prove difficult to
recoup without a patent. As a general matter, it boils down to a
question of (1) the up-front investment required for the innovator;
(2) the cost savings available to an imitator; (3) the lead-time
advantage likely available in the absence of a patent; (4) the
extent to which products will remain differentiated even after
entry occurs; and (5) the availability of reputational rents due to
imperfect information in the markets for the innovation. 173 While
some mistakes in the sorting process are inevitable, a rough
sorting of patented inventions along a spectrum from easy
advances to hard advances, corresponding to some rough sense for
the corresponding level of patent protection required to bring them
forth seems, while not a trivial exercise, entirely practicable.
Such a rough sorting would yield two tangible benefits. First, it
would reduce the overprotection costs otherwise associated with
173 See Lunney, supra note 27, at 56 (noting that in the absence of a patent system, an
innovator will have a lead time over imitators but that eventual copying will reduce rents
available to an innovator, and also noting that product differentiation and a reputation for
innovating will mean that innovations will be priced above marginal cost); see also
Jonathan M. Barnett, Do Patents Matter? Empirical Evidence on the Incentive Thesis, in
HANDBOOK ON LAW, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 178, 178-79 (Robert E. Litan ed., 2011)
(referencing empirical studies testing whether the patent system actually incentivizes
innovations that would be made if free-riders existed).
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the easy advances in an otherwise uniform system of protection.
Second, and more important, it would enable the patent system to
provide the broader protection necessary to encourage the more
difficult advances.
Despite these potential benefits, the Federal Circuit has been
curiously reluctant to engage in such a rough sorting, relegating
the nonobviousness requirement to the role of bit player in the
patent system. In part, this is due to the Federal Circuit's
174
rejection of the notion that patents are undesirable monopolies.
In the Federal Circuit's eyes, patents are simply property,
presumptively desirable. 175 As a result, the court sees no sense in
attempting to sort those inventions that are worth "the
176
embarrassment of an exclusive patent" from those that are not,
or in a nonobviousness doctrine that purports to do so.
Yet this "simply property" perspective has not been the only
reason behind the Federal Circuit's refusal to enforce a vibrant
The court's jurisprudence also
nonobviousness requirement.
reflects a strong fear of hindsight. And it is to this fear which we
now turn.
IV. HINDSIGHT, BIAS, AND OBVIOUSNESS
A. THE FEAR OF HINDSIGHT IN PATENT LAW

Patent law has had a longstanding fear of hindsight in the
obviousness determination. Indeed, even before the issue became
known as "obviousness" with the enactment of the Patent Act of
1952, courts had recognized the tendency for hindsight to make an
improvement or advance seem simpler or easier than it in fact
was. In 1897, for example, the Second Circuit upheld a patent on
an improvement to the sewing machine, concluding that it
constituted the work of an inventor and not that of a skilled
mechanic.177 In reaching its conclusion, the court acknowledged

174
175
176
177

Lunney, supra note 37, at 380.
Id.
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
Schenck v. Singer Mfg. Co., 77 F. 841, 844 (2d Cir. 1897).

86

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:41

that "[i]n view of the prior state of the art thus exhibited, it seems
now to have been a very simple thing to do what was done by the
patentees." 178 The court refused, however, to accept hindsight's
suggestion of apparent ease. Rather, the court found invention in
the patent based upon the so-called secondary considerations.
Despite the invention's seeming simplicity, it offered clear
advantages over the prior art, and despite the "vast number of
skilled workmen" working in the field, no one else had discovered
it.179

Other courts reached similar conclusions.180

From these

cases, the Seventh Circuit derived the following rule: "Whether a

178

Id.

As the court explained:
But the record in this case affords extrinsic evidence of a most convincing
kind that what was done by the patentees was not an obvious thing, and
that the change of organization was not one which the skilled mechanics of
the particular art could have suggested and introduced without the exercise
of inventive faculty. This evidence is supplied, not only by the many
patents for improvements, which fell short of producing the simple,
compact, less expensive, and more efficient bearings of the patent, but by
the sterility, during 20 years, of the great army of mechanics employed by
the various sewing-machine manufacturers. The complainant itself, from
1865 to 1879, used the overhung stud, and for several years of that period
its machines contained cross braces readily adaptable to the office of the
patented brace. It employed a vast number of skilled workmen. Yet to
none of them did the suggestion occur which is embodied in the new
organization of the patentees. The simple change made by the patentees
has proved so valuable that the complainant has adopted it in more than
9,000,000 sewing machines.
The sewing-machine company whose
president is the defendant in this suit has also adopted it. No one can
examine the bearings of the patent, even cursorily, and compare them with
those previously in use, without recognizing the meritorious improvements
which they embody.
We agree with the court below that these
improvements were invention, and not merely the exercise of mechanical
skill and adaptation.
Id.; see also Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Thum, 111 F. 904, 905-06 (2d Cir. 1901)
(following similar approach).
180 See, e.g., Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Kar Eng'g Co., 154 F.2d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 1946)
(rejecting hindsight's suggestion that an advance was obvious); Becket v. Coe, 98 F.2d 332,
336 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (same), rev'd in part, No. 6790, 1938 WL 28299 (D.C. Cir. June 6,
1938); Skinner Bros. Belting Co. v. Oil Well Improvements Co., 54 F.2d 896, 898 (10th Cir.
1931) (acknowledging "[w]e know that we should try to eliminate 'hindsight'" in
determining whether a patent constitutes invention); cf. Am. Valve & Meter Co. v.
Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 249 F. 234, 239 (7th Cir. 1917) (noting that "even with the aid of
hindsight we fail to see in the patent anything other than a meritorious invention").
179

Id.
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patent involves invention is to be determined in the light of
historical facts rather than what might appear to be simple in the
light of hindsight." 18 1
With the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, courts tied the
prohibition on hindsight to the statute's requirement that the
obviousness or nonobviousness of the patented invention be
determined "at the time the invention was made." 18 2 Yet the basic
approach to guarding against undue or improper hindsight
remained the same. Against the appearance of simplicity that
hindsight might suggest, courts posited the simple fact that no one
else had previously developed the invention at issue. This was not
always sufficient to save a patent,1 8 3 but as the Court recognized in
Graham, focusing on secondary considerations such as long-felt
but unsolved need, the failure of others, and commercial success
"may... serve to 'guard against slipping into use of hindsight,'
and to resist the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings
of the invention in issue."8 4
Under the Federal Circuit, the fear of hindsight also became a
justification for the requirement that the prior art teach, suggest,

181 Lakeshire Cheese Co. v. Shefford Cheese Co., 72 F.2d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1934).
182 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1952). See In re Sporck, 301 F.2d 686, 689 (C.C.P.A. 1962) ("In
determining the issue here we are required by 35 U.S.C. § 103 to do so from the vantage
point of one having ordinary skill in the metal spinning art and then to determine whether
or not the claimed invention would have been obvious to such a person at the time the
invention was made. This requires us to view the prior art without reading into that art the
teachings of appellant's invention."); see also Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. &
Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 1964) ("The first [principle] is that in considering
the question of obviousness, we must view the prior art from the point in time just prior to
when the patented device was made. Many things may seem obvious after they have been
made, and for this reason courts should guard against slipping into use of hindsight.").
183 For example, in Procter& Gamble Co. v. Berlin Mills Co., the Second Circuit reversed
the district court's holding that a patent claim was invalid for lack of invention. 256 F. 23,
26-27 (2d Cir. 1918), rev'd, 254 U.S. 156 (1920). In reversing, the court explained that "the
question really is one of measuring foresight by hindsight. The problem seems easy now,
but, when the object reached was desirable, useful, and apt for commercial success, the bald
fact that nobody ever did it before is persuasive, though not conclusive, evidence of some
invention." Id. at 26. Yet, on further appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
patent claims lacked invention. Berlin Mills Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 254 U.S. 156, 166
(1920).
184 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (quoting Monroe Auto
Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 1964)).
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or motivate a given combination of elements in order to establish
the prima facie obviousness of the combination.18 5 In KSR itself,
the Court, while acknowledging "the distortion caused by
hindsight bias" and the need to "be cautious of arguments reliant
upon ex post reasoning,"' 18 6 rejected the need for a teaching,
suggestion, or motivation as an absolute prerequisite for finding
87
the obviousness of a given combination of prior art elements.
Nevertheless, even after KSR, the Federal Circuit has continued to
insist that the teaching, suggestion, or motivation test, flexible
now rather than rigid, remains an important guard against the
88
improper use of hindsight.
Despite the repeated and pervasive cautions against the use of
hindsight, patent law does not prohibit the use of hindsight
altogether in obviousness determinations. 1 89 To the contrary,
patent law expressly allows the obviousness decision maker to

1 See ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce
the claimed invention, absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the combination.");
see also McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ('The
genius of invention is often a combination of known elements which in hindsight seems
preordained. To prevent hindsight invalidation of patent claims, the law requires some
'teaching, suggestion or reason' to combine cited references."); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234
F.3d 654, 664 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("In order to prevent a hindsight-based obviousness analysis,
we have clearly established that the relevant inquiry for determining the scope and content
of the prior art is whether there is a reason, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art or
elsewhere that would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the references.");
In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("To prevent the use of hindsight based
on the invention to defeat patentability of the invention, this court requires the examiner to
show a motivation to combine the references that create the case of obviousness."); Tex.
Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Absent
such suggestion to combine the references, respondents can do no more than piece the
invention together using the patented invention as a template. Such hindsight reasoning is
impermissible.").
186 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
187 Id. at 421-22.
188 See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (holding after KSR that "a flexible TSM test remains the primary guarantor against a
non-statutory hindsight analysis such as occurred in this case"); In re Translogic Tech., Inc.,
504 F.3d 1249, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("In any event, as the Supreme Court suggests, a
flexible approach to the TSM test prevents hindsight and focuses on evidence before the
time of invention, without unduly constraining the breadth of knowledge available to one of
ordinary skill in the art during the obviousness analysis." (citation omitted)).
189 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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consider a number of facts arising after the date of invention.
Many of the so-called secondary factors, including the commercial
success of a patented invention, copying of the patented invention
by others, or its widespread licensing, necessarily arise after the
time of invention and thus represent hindsight. Yet the Federal
Circuit has emphasized that this hindsight evidence may provide
"the most probative and cogent evidence available" on the
Going further, the Federal Circuit has
obviousness issue. 190
expressly held that such evidence "must always when present be
The failure to recognize that this evidence
considered."'19 1
represents an apparently permissible form of hindsight is a
curious blind spot in the court's otherwise pervasive
jurisprudential war on hindsight.
Thus, patent law does not prohibit altogether the use of facts
arising after the date of invention in making obviousness
Rather, the prohibition on hindsight seems
determinations.
focused on one particular type of hindsight-the use of the
inventors' own discovery against them. Yet this is not hindsight at
all. An inventor's own discovery does not arise after the date of
invention, but simultaneously with it. Perhaps that helps explain
why the prohibition on using hindsight often seems, in practice,
more a rhetorical trump card than a meaningful analytical rubric.
Invariably, patent applicants and patentees insist that any
conclusion of obviousness represents no more than an
impermissible hindsight reconstruction. 192 When a district judge
or a Patent and Trademark Office examiner nevertheless
concludes that an invention is obvious despite the claim of
hindsight, appellate panels sometimes reverse. 19 3 When they do
not, a dissenting judge will often chide the majority for failing to
190 Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
191 Id.; see also Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed.

Cir. 1984) (reversing finding of obviousness for failure to consider evidence of secondary
considerations); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(same).
192 See, e.g., In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966) ("Appellant presents the
usual argument that hindsight reconstruction has been employed by the examiner and the
board.").
193 See supra note 16.
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recognize the improper presence of hindsight,19 4 and when they do,
a dissenting judge will often chide the majority for seeing
195
hindsight when, in the dissenter's view, it was not there.
Even within a single opinion, courts will use hindsight to
explain why a patented invention was obvious while at the same
time insisting that the use of hindsight is improper. For example,
in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, the invention
pertained to chisel plows. 1 96 When a chisel plow is in use, the
point of the plow digs a furrow several inches deep. Sometimes as
the plow is digging the furrow, it will encounter an obstacle, such
as a large buried rock. At that point, the plow needs to ride up
and over the obstacle and then return to digging the furrow at the
appropriate depth.1 97 Graham patented a particular arrangement
of the key elements-the shaft of the plow, a hinge plate, and the
body of the plow-in a way that apparently improved the plow's
performance, in terms of breakage and wear, significantly.1 98 At
the time of invention, no one knew all the reasons why Graham's
arrangement worked better than prior arrangements; apparently,
it just did.1 99 When the patent was eventually litigated, Graham's
attorney theorized that the arrangement worked better because it
allowed free flexing of the plow shaft along its full length.200 In
holding Graham's arrangement obvious, the Court wrote:
If free-flexing, as petitioners now argue, is the crucial
difference above the prior art, then it appears evident
that the desired result would be obtainable by not
boxing the shank within the confines of the hinge. The
only other effective place available in the arrangement
was to attach it below the hinge plate and run it

194

See supra note 17.

195 See, e.g., In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reversing Board of Patent

Appeals over Judge Smith's dissent and holding that examiner improperly relied on
hindsight).
1- 383 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
197 Id. at 19-20.
198 Id. at 20-21.
199 Id. at 23.
200 Id.
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through a stirrup or bracket that would not disturb its
flexing qualities. Certainly a person having ordinary
skill in the prior art, given the fact that the flex in the
shank could be utilized more effectively if allowed to
run the entire length of the shank, would immediately
see that the thing to do was what Graham did, i.e.,
20 1
invert the shank and the hinge plate.

In this passage, the Court used the insight from Graham's own
invention-that free flexing of the plow shaft is desirable-against
him. Later in the same opinion, however, the Court emphasized
the need "to 'guard against slipping into use of hindsight,' and to
resist the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the
invention in issue. 20 2
Patent law's fear of hindsight is thus, at best, inconsistent.
Patent law fears some types of hindsight but embraces others.
Even where patent law seems clear that the use of certain types of
hindsight is prohibited, judges disagree over whether hindsight
was in fact impermissibly used in any given case. And sometimes,
even when courts say that certain types of hindsight should not be
used, they use it anyway.
To rise above mere rhetoric and use hindsight as a meaningful
analytical tool, we need a better understanding of hindsight and
The key
the ways in which it informs our decisionmaking.
question is whether hindsight helps improve our decisionmaking
on obviousness and if so, how. As discussed above, for each
patented invention there is some risk of obviousness that is
socially optimal, in that it ensures for each socially desirable
invention that the expected incentives from the patent exactly
cover the invention's otherwise unrecoverable expected costs. The
question thus becomes whether, and when, the use of hindsight
information improves the patent system's ability to achieve that
optimal risk of an obviousness result. To begin exploring that
question, the next section examines the role of hindsight in a world
of limited information.
201
202

Id. at 24-25 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 36 (citation omitted).
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B. IMPERFECT INFORMATION AND HINDSIGHT

As a general matter, hindsight plays a central and important
role in our everyday lives. Reviewing how things turned out can
improve the information available, and thus our decisionmaking,
when, as is often the case, a given set of choices recurs. Consider
the simple example of a stop sign. The law requires drivers to
come to a full and complete stop at a stop sign, but many drivers
do not. A driver approaching a stop sign can run it, roll it, or obey
it.
If the driver matches the assumptions of neoclassical
economics, the driver will choose between these three options in
order to maximize utility. Invariably, however, the driver will
have imperfect information regarding the utilities each choice
offers. What is the marginal increase in the likelihood of an
accident at this particular stop sign at this particular time of day
from rolling the stop sign rather than stopping completely? What
is the marginal increase in the chance of an accident from running
it altogether? What is the likely cost if an accident occurs? What
is the chance and cost of a traffic ticket? How much time can the
driver save by not coming to a complete stop? Given the driver's
schedule for the day and other circumstances, what is the
marginal utility associated with that time savings?
When first approaching a given stop sign, a driver may have a
good sense of some of these values but relatively imperfect
information regarding the others. Over time and by repeatedly
making different choices at the same stop sign, the driver will
build up through hindsight a reasonably good sense of the costs
and benefits associated with running, rolling, or obeying the stop
sign. The actual results in terms of the decisions the driver makes
and the resulting outcomes-whether accident or no accident,
ticket or no ticket-will come over time to match reasonably well
the actual distribution of risks associated with each decision. Of
course, there will be outliers-those unlucky souls who get a ticket
or into an accident every time they fail to come to a complete stop,
or the carefree drivers who never do. We should expect, however,
the actual risks, costs, and benefits drivers experience to form a
bell curve around the true values. As a result, on average,
updating the available information set regarding those risks, costs,
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and benefits through the use of hindsight should help our driver
develop a more accurate decisionmaking heuristic over time.
This is true not just for decisions about whether to stop at stop
signs, but decisions more generally. We make decisions all of the
time and never have perfect information as to the decision's true
costs and benefits. But if the opportunity for a choice repeats
itself, over time our choices and their consequences should begin to
approach the average and, in that sense, true costs and benefits
associated with the decision. As a result, if we define bias as a
difference between (1) the true costs and benefits of a choice and
(2) our perception of those costs and benefits, then the use of
hindsight in our everyday lives typically reduces bias over time by
bringing our perception of the risks, costs, or benefits associated
with a choice more in line with the true values.
Hindsight offers the same benefit with respect to the question of
obviousness.
Consider a simplified model of the interaction
between investments in innovation and patentability. A given
innovation can either be hard or easy. If it is hard, our researcher
will not invest in the innovation unless he or she will receive a
patent for the innovation. If it is easy, our researcher will invest
in the innovation whether a patent results or not. Of course, even
if it is easy, the researcher would still prefer to receive a patent.
In making investment decisions, our researcher has an expectation
as to whether any given innovation will prove hard or easy, but
that expectation may be mistaken.
Given this framework, the question becomes: Should we award
patents based upon the researcher's expectation of the innovation's
difficulty at the outset, or based upon how things actually turn
out? In other words, should we make obviousness determinations
using hindsight? The answer: Use hindsight. In this framework,
to maximize social utility, we should make obviousness
determinations and award patents (or not) based not on the
researcher's expectations in approaching the project, but on how
things actually turned out.
Using hindsight and awarding patents based upon how things
actually turned out ensures that the innovation is found
nonobvious and hence receives a patent when it was in fact hard,
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and it further ensures that the innovation is found obvious and
hence does not receive a valid patent when it was in fact easy. A
researcher, knowing that a patent will be forthcoming if the
innovation in fact turns out to be hard, can invest in an innovation
whether the researcher expects the innovation at the outset of the
research to be hard or easy. If the researcher expects it to be hard
and it is, the researcher will receive a patent and knows that and
will therefore pursue the innovation. If the researcher expects it
to be easy and it turns out to be hard, the researcher will continue
working on the innovation. Because the innovation turned out to
be hard, the researcher will receive a patent and knows that. On
the other hand, if the researcher expects it to be easy and it is, or
expects it to be hard but it turns out to be easy, the researcher will
not receive a patent and knows that. The researcher will
nevertheless pursue or continue work on these easy innovations
because the additional incentives a patent might provide are
unnecessary to encourage investment in such easy innovations.
In contrast, a rule that awarded patents on the basis of the
researcher's initial expectations would create two problems. First,
if our researcher expected the innovation to be easy, and it turned
out to be hard, a rule that awarded patents based solely on initial
expectations and ignored how things actually turned out would
deny the researcher a patent. As a result, once it became clear
that the innovation was going to be hard, the researcher would
abandon the work.
Second, if our researcher expected the
innovation to be hard, but it turned out to be easy, a rule that
awarded patents based solely on initial expectations would give
the researcher a patent unnecessarily, creating the associated
deadweight losses.
Despite this perfectly sensible justification for using hindsight,
the prohibition on at least some kinds of hindsight seems to arise
from two concerns. First, using the inventor's own work on the
obviousness issue may lead to a mistaken conclusion of
obviousness because the inventor had exceptional, rather than
ordinary, skill in the art. For a person with exceptional skill,
certain inventions may prove easy where they would have been
hard for a person of ordinary skill. As a result, a test that focuses
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on whether the invention was hard or easy for the actual inventor
might deny patents to the true genius. Yet, if that is our concern,
several of the secondary factors, including long-felt but unsolved
need and failure of others, should help us sort out directly whether
an easy innovation was easy because the inventor happened to be
a genius or because it would have been easy for a person of
ordinary skill.
Second, hindsight may also lead the decision maker mistakenly
to identify a hard invention as easy by providing a roadmap to
piece together the relevant prior art to solve the problem at hand.
The risk here is that, while we judge obviousness from the
perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art, who is
presumed to know all of the relevant prior art, we must not focus
our hypothetical person's attention on only that prior art that the
inventor's own work proves is the most directly relevant and
helpful. Thus, if we imagine our person of ordinary skill in the art
sitting in a shop with the prior art references hanging around, as
Judge Rich once suggested, 2 3 we must ensure that the walls
include all of the prior art references, the helpful as well as the
unhelpful. When we imagine our hypothetical person looking at
all the available prior art, the task at hand may well seem
impossible. In contrast, if we imagine our person of ordinary skill
in the art sitting in a shop with only those prior art references that
the inventor's own work has shown to be most helpful, the task of
connecting the dots may seem trivially easy. 20 4 As the Federal
Circuit has explained:
It is wrong to use the patent in suit as a guide through
the maze of prior art references, combining the right
203 In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966) ("Appellant presents the usual
argument that hindsight reconstruction has been employed by the examiner and the board.
We disagree with that position. We think the proper way to apply the 103 obviousness test
to a case like this is to first picture the inventor as working in his shop with the prior art
references-which he is presumed to know-hanging on the walls around him.").
204 See In re Antle, 444 F.2d 1168, 1171 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (holding that limiting references
to those "'in the very same art' ... does not apply in cases where the very point in issue is
whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have selected, without the advantage of
hindsight and knowledge of the applicant's disclosure, the particular references which the
examiner applied").
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references in the right way so as to achieve the result
of the claims in suit. Monday morning quarterbacking
is quite improper when resolving the question of
20 5
nonobviousness in a court of law.
While this second concern raises an interesting possibility, the key
question is the extent to which hindsight, or certain types of
hindsight, will actually lead to such mistakes. Using a series of
surveys, Professor Mandel has attempted to answer that question.
C. TESTING FOR HINDSIGHT AND HINDSIGHT BIAS: PROFESSOR
MANDEL'S WORK

For his research, Professor Mandel followed survey protocols
that social science researchers have developed and used to identify
20 6
the influence and significance of hindsight on a variety of issues.
The protocols essentially provide two groups of respondents with
two information sets: the first lays out a question or problem with
the information available up to the point where the question or
problem is resolved, and the second includes the same "before the
fact" information set but adds information regarding how the
20 7
event actually turned out.
In applying this protocol to the use of hindsight in obviousness
determinations, Professor Mandel developed fact patterns based
upon two litigated patents. 20 8 The first focused on finding a way to
teach baseball players how to pitch without the need for one-onone instruction.20 9 The solution actually developed and patented
205

Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (per

curiam).
206 Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious, supra note 19, at 1400; see also Baruch Fischhoff,
Hindsightt- Foresight:The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 289 (1975) (outlining

basic protocol for testing hindsight bias); Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations
of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 502-04 (1996) (surveying
wide variety of hindsight bias studies); Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian
Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-analysis, 48 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 147 (1991) (meta-analysis of more than 120 hindsight bias studies).
207 See Fischhoff, supra note 206, at 289 (describing protocol).
208 Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious, supra note 19, at 1406-07.
209 Id. at 1407.
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was to manufacture a baseball with the finger positions for various
pitches marked on the surface of the ball.210 The second fact
pattern focused on finding a way to incorporate a salty taste into
fishing lures. 211 The solution actually developed and patented was
212
to add salt into the plastic of the lure itself.
For each fact pattern, Professor Mandel created a brief (one
page or so) description of (1) the relevant prior art and (2) the
problem to be solved. 213 Based simply on this description, and
without telling his respondents the nature of the solution or even
if one had been found, he then asked two different groups of
respondents, one for the baseball and one for the salty-tasting lure,
whether they believed that a solution to the problem at issue
would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art.2 1 4 For
this "no hindsight" or "foresight" scenario, 24% of his respondents
thought a solution to the baseball fact pattern was obvious, and
23% of his respondents thought a solution to the salty-tasting lure
215
fact pattern was obvious.
With these foresight scenarios as a benchmark, Professor
Mandel then presented the same descriptions to two additional
response groups. For these second groups, however, Professor
Mandel added the fact that the problem had been solved and
provided a brief description of the solution devised. With the
benefit of this hindsight, the respondents were asked if they
believed the solution to the problem was obvious. In this hindsight
scenario, 76% of the respondents said the solution to the baseball
fact pattern was obvious, and 59% of the respondents said the
21 6
solution to the salty-tasting lure fact pattern was obvious.
Finding the differences between the two scenarios to be large and

210 See McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (describing
patent).
211 Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious, supra note 19, at 1407.
212 See Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 953, 954-55 (Fed. Cir. 1997)

(describing patent).
213 Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious, supra note 19, at 1456-59.
214 Id.
at 1460.
215 Id. at 1409.
216

Id.
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statistically significant, Professor Mandel proclaimed his results
217
proof of a hindsight bias.
Both his survey design and his
We are not so sure.
In terms of
interpretation of the results present difficulties.
First,
survey design, there are at least two serious issues.
Professor Mandel changes the question that he asks the
respondents. For the foresight scenario, he asks if a solution to
the problem was obvious. In the hindsight scenario, he asks if this
solution was obvious. 2 18 Although this slight change in wording
seems small-just a few letters, after all-in surveying, seemingly
small changes can lead to large differences in outcome. With this
change in wording, Professor Mandel moves from an abstract
inquiry whether any imaginable solution to this problem is obvious
to a specific inquiry whether a given solution is obvious. He moves
from essentially two questions--"Is there a solution, and, if so, is it
obvious?"-to a single question-"Here's the solution. Now is it
obvious?"
It is impossible to know whether this change in wording made a
difference in Professor Mandel's results. But it raises a real
question as to whether Professor Mandel has found something real
or simply an artifact of his survey's design.
Our second concern with Professor Mandel's survey design is
the limited information that he provides his respondents. Given
limited initial information on an issue, people will invariably
update their information set when they see how things actually
turned out. Indeed, Professor Mandel's set-up seems predisposed
to create the largest possible difference between the hindsight and
foresight scenarios. Respondents are given a brief description of

217

Id. at 1411. In Professor Mandel's words:
The results demonstrate that the hindsight bias significantly influences
non-obvious judgments. Participants who were not informed of the
invention were substantially more likely to judge a solution non-obvious
than participants who were informed what the invention was. The
magnitude of the hindsight bias in these patent scenarios was striking and
is greater than that reported for other legal judgments.

Id.
218

Id. at 1408 & n.60.
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the prior art 2 19 but no real understanding of the art, the principles
that underlie it, or how it might tie together. They are asked to
answer the obviousness inquiry as if they were a person of
ordinary skill in the art, yet they have no such skill.
While we certainly understand the need to simplify for the
purposes of a survey, no reasonable patent attorney is going to
allow a case to go forward on summary judgment, let alone to trial,
with the sort of summary information Professor Mandel provided
his respondents. 220 The plaintiffs attorney will certainly present
evidence concerning the difficulties encountered on the road to
invention. The judge and the jury will hear extensive testimony
regarding the long nights, the false trails, and the other elements
now common to the heroic inventor story. The defense attorney
will counter with evidence, showing how the prior art ties together
and how its underlying principles lead almost inevitably to the
patentee's solution.
Rather than this conflicting, but rich, tableau, respondents in
Professor Mandel's surveys are presented with only an
informational skeleton. Given the limited information they are
provided, it seems to us almost inevitable that respondents will
seize upon the fact and nature of the invention as a proxy for the
otherwise missing or indecipherable information. As the most
easily understood, and perhaps the only understandable,
information available on the difficulty of solving the problem at
issue, respondents may give the fact of invention undue weight.
Indeed, it may become dispositive.
The real question here is not whether respondents used the fact
that a problem was solved to help resolve the obviousness inquiry.
Mere knowledge of the fact and nature of the solution is not the
sort of illegitimate hindsight with which patent law is concerned.
It does not indicate that respondents used that solution as a
roadmap to connect the prior art dots. Nor does it establish that
the respondent used the solution to focus on some pieces of prior
Id. at 1456-59.
While Professor Mandel acknowledged this problem with his format, he did not believe
that it would affect the validity of his results. See id. at 1413-14 (discussing limitations of
the study).
219
220
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art while ignoring others. At most, the difference that Professor
Mandel finds establishes that the respondent used the additional
information provided-the solution-to help understand the
information already available. It does not establish that they used
this information, even if we label it hindsight, improperly.
More troubling than these questions of survey design, however,
is Professor Mandel's interpretation of his results as evidence of
"bias. '221 Bias refers not to a difference in outcomes but to a
difference from the true value. 222 One might try to argue that the
foresight scenario's obviousness outcome represents the true value
on the grounds that the statute prohibits the use of hindsight.
There are two problems with such an argument, however. First,
while the statute states that nonobviousness is to be determined
"at the time the invention was made," it does not state that
relevant after-arising information cannot be considered in making
that determination. 223 Thus, the statute does not prohibit the use
of hindsight in determining whether an invention was obvious at
the time it was made. Second, even if the statute did prohibit the
use of hindsight, the information in Professor Mandel's "hindsight"
scenario is not hindsight. The fact and nature of the invention
does not arise after the invention was made, but at the time it was
made. Therefore, it is not hindsight.
The question, then, is not whether the obviousness outcomes
are different in the two scenarios. It is which outcome comes
closer to the socially optimal obviousness outcome. In other words,
to determine if hindsight leads to bias, we would need to know, for
the baseball patent, whether the 76% obviousness result of the
hindsight scenario or the 24% obviousness result of the foresight
scenario comes closer to the socially optimal resolution of the
obviousness issue. Similarly, for the fishing lure, we would need
to know whether the 59% obviousness result of the hindsight
scenario or the 23% obviousness result of the foresight scenario is
closer to the optimal result. Given that the purpose of the
at 1411.
See Daniel L. Rudinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 222 (2d ed. 2000) (defining "bias").
223 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
221 Id.
222
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nonobviousness requirement is to create a risk of invalidity that
improves the match between the effective level of protection
provided and the level of protection needed to bring forth a given
advance, results should be measured against that purpose.
While not perfectly clear, a plausible case can be made that
Professor Mandel's hindsight results are closer than the foresight
results to the obviousness results in the actual litigated cases. For
the patent on the baseball, the jury found the invention not proven
obvious, yet the district court granted judgment as a matter of law
that the invention was obvious; however, the Federal Circuit
reversed and reinstated the jury verdict, over Judge Michel's
dissent. 224 Thus, two judges held the invention obvious, and two
judges and a jury held its obviousness not proven.225 In the case of
the fishing lure, the district court granted summary judgment,
concluding that the invention was obvious, but a panel of the
226 So
Federal Circuit reversed, again over Judge Michel's dissent.
again, two judges held the invention obvious, and two held its
obviousness not proven. The actual results in these cases thus
suggest that the obviousness issue in both was pretty close.
Indeed, the very fact that the cases were litigated rather than
settled suggests that obviousness was a close issue. Given the
disproportionate stakes in patent litigation, patentees and alleged
infringers choose to litigate, rather than settle, not on the 50-50
case, but, typically, on a 30-70 case. 227 Taken together, these facts
suggest that the obviousness results in Professor Mandel's
hindsight scenarios probably come closer to the 50%-70%
obviousness value that the litigation of the cases suggest is
appropriate than the obviousness results in the foresight
scenarios.

McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1343, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
That the jury found the invention's obviousness not proven also suggests that Professor
Mandel's survey results do not duplicate real-world conditions. After all, the inventor's
solution was certainly described to the jury. Despite the benefits of that hindsight, the jury
nonetheless concluded that the invention was not proven obvious.
226 Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 953, 954 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
227 See Lunney, supra note 27, at 12-14 (analyzing patterns of settlement and appellate
224
225

success).
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Of course, using the actual results in these cases as a proxy for
the "right" result is not entirely satisfactory. The actual results in
the cases reflect existing doctrine, which in turn reflects a given
view of hindsight bias. Given that we are trying to determine if
that view of hindsight bias is accurate, we cannot assume that the
actual results are also the socially optimal results. To do so would
almost necessarily concede that the existing doctrine's view of
hindsight bias must be accurate. Yet that is the very question we
are trying to answer. Another way to see this point is to note that
both cases were decided before the Supreme Court's decision in
KSR. Given that both may well have come out differently had
they been decided afterwards, if we use actual results as a proxy
for "right" results, then we would have to allow our socially
optimal result to change depending on whether these cases were
decided before or after KSR. But that cannot be right. The costs
and benefits of upholding or striking down these patents dictate
the socially optimal result, not the relative timing of these
decisions vis-A-vis KSR.
Thus, Professor Mandel's work demonstrates a statistically
significant and large difference in obviousness outcomes when we
tell respondents that the problem at hand has been solved and
explain how. Yet we cannot tell if this difference is simply an
artifact of the survey format, or whether it represents something
likely to be present in real-world litigation. Even if the difference
matches real-world experience, we also cannot tell whether this
additional information leads to bias, in the sense of a deviation
from the ideal, or merely a difference, in the sense of a deviation
between the hindsight and foresight scenarios.
D. TESTING FOR A HINDSIGHT DIFFERENCE WITH AN EXPANDED
INFORMATION SET

To explore these remaining questions, we took Professor
Mandel's basic approach and devised our own parallel set of
materials. Our problem focused on dental hygiene. In the survey
materials, we described the prior art, including conventional
toothbrushes, floss, and ultrasonic or vibrating toothbrushes. We
then described some of the advantages and disadvantages of each.
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A conventional toothbrush is inexpensive but fails to clean some
areas between and behind the teeth. Floss is great for cleaning
between teeth, but many people fail to use it.
Ultrasonic
toothbrushes clean behind teeth well but are expensive. We then
described the problem our would-be inventor faced: design an
inexpensive toothbrush that cleans as well between teeth as floss
and as well behind teeth as an ultrasonic toothbrush.
Following Professor Mandel's lead, we began by exploring the
difference in obviousness outcomes for foresight and hindsight
scenarios. First, we asked a group of student respondents, based
upon a description of these prior art devices and the problem to be
solved, whether they believed that a solution would be obvious to a
person of ordinary skill in the art of dental hygiene. Forty-eight
percent of respondents thought that a solution would be obvious.
Second, we compared this foresight scenario to the obviousness
percentage for a hindsight scenario. For the hindsight scenario,
we provided the respondents with the same descriptions of the
prior art and the problem to be solved, but we added a statement
that the problem had been solved and a brief description of the
resulting toothbrush.
With the benefit of this hindsight
information, 70% of respondents thought that a solution would be
obvious. Like Professor Mandel, we found a large and statistically
significant (p=0.04) difference between the obviousness outcomes
8
in the foresight and hindsight scenarios. 22
To begin exploring the possible shortcomings of Professor
Mandel's work, we then devised a third scenario, which we called
the "partial" hindsight scenario.
In this third scenario, we
provided the respondents with the same descriptions of the prior
art and the problem to be solved. We also told them that the
problem had been solved. However, rather than present one
solution, we presented the respondents with four possible solutions
and told them that one of the four had been developed and
patented, but that the other three were "never invented, never
developed, and never patented." We did not tell the respondents
which one of the four possible solutions was the actual one

.2

We calculated p values using Fisher's exact test.
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developed and patented. Thus, respondents had the benefit of
some hindsight-knowing the problem had been solved-but not
perfect hindsight. We then described the four possible solutions,
presenting the actual solution second, and after all four were
presented, asked the respondents if each would have been obvious.
We had three issues we wanted to address through this
scenario. First, we wanted to explore whether the hindsight
difference Professor Mandel found remained as large when the
hindsight was placed in a broader informational context. In this
regard, the four possibilities, three of which did not work, might
represent the sort of evidence judges and juries would likely hear
regarding false trails and missteps on the path to the patented
Second, we wanted to explore the nature of the
invention.
hindsight at work. In this scenario, respondents have some
hindsight information. They are told that the problem has been
solved but are uncertain as to which of the possible solutions
actually worked. From an engineering or scientific perspective,
knowing that there is a solution is often half the battle. So we
wanted to determine whether knowing that there was a solution
would generate the same hindsight difference. Third, we wanted
to check for a demand effect, to see if the order in which the
possible solutions were presented to the respondents affected the
obviousness results.
Although hindsight is clearly present in this third scenario, our
results reflect no statistically significant hindsight difference
between this scenario and the original foresight scenario. In
response to whether the actual solution would have been obvious
to a person of ordinary skill in the art, only 38% of respondents
thought that it was. This obviousness result is statistically
229
indistinguishable from the result in the foresight case (p=0.419).
Unfortunately, from the results, we cannot tell why there was no
hindsight effect. We cannot tell if the lack of a hindsight effect
was due to (1) the differing nature of the hindsight information
available, that is, knowledge only that a solution was found but
not its nature; or (2) the reduced importance of the hindsight
229

More precisely, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the obviousness percentages

are the same.
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information, given the additional information provided by the
description of the three failed solutions. Further work will be
necessary to distinguish between these possibilities. Yet the
results plainly establish that the presence of this partial hindsight
does not inevitably lead to a difference in obviousness results, let
alone any bias.
The third scenario also revealed a steady decline in the
obviousness results across the four possible solutions. Ninety
percent of respondents believed that the first proposed solution
was obvious. Thirty-eight percent of respondents believed that the
second proposed solution-the actual solution-was obvious.
Sixteen percent of respondents believed that the third proposed
solution was obvious. And 6% of respondents believed that the
fourth proposed solution was obvious. The differences between the
obviousness results for the first, second, and fourth proposed
solution are large and statistically significant. Although not
definitive, 230 the tendency of respondents to leap to an obviousness
conclusion for the first proposed solution, once they know there is
a solution, strongly suggests that Professor Mandel's supposed
hindsight difference may reflect, at least in part, a demand effect
or respondents' desire to get the answer "right."
For our fourth scenario, we wanted to explore whether any of
the hindsight difference arose because the survey respondents
were not persons of skill in the art. We considered different
approaches that we might use to try and get respondents to act
and think more like persons of skill in the art. In the end, we
settled on simply asking the respondents to write briefly how they
thought the problem might be solved. We asked for their written
suggestions after describing the prior art and the problem to be
solved, but before walking through the four possible solutions.
After giving respondents an opportunity to write down their
suggested solutions, 231 we then presented the four possible
230 The differences could be due to some inherent difference in the obviousness of the four
proposed solutions. Although the results of the fourth scenario, discussed infra, tend to
refute that, further testing may be necessary to resolve that possibility.
231 Of the fifty respondents, thirty-seven wrote some sort of proposed solution.
The
remaining thirteen either wrote that they could not think of a solution or left the space
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solutions, with the actual solution again second on the list, and
then asked with respect to each of the four possible solutions
whether it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary
skill in the art.
Through this approach, we hoped to have our respondents
approach the problem in at least the same way as would a person
of ordinary skill in the art. While the respondents would still lack
formal or informal training in the art, they would at least grapple
with the problem directly and engage it actively, rather than
passively accept the information that we provided. We also hoped
that this would reduce if not eliminate any tendency of
respondents to use the fact of a solution as a proxy for the
difficulty of that solution.
Our results from this scenario were surprising. The hindsight
information available in the third and fourth scenarios is the
same. Both offer some hindsight-we mention that the problem
has been solved but do not identify the actual solution, and we
present the actual solution as one of four possible solutions. As a
result, given that we found no hindsight difference between the
foresight scenario and partial hindsight scenario, there should be
no hindsight difference in the fourth scenario.
Yet 58% of
respondents thought the actual solution was obvious.
This
obviousness result is statistically indistinguishable from the 70%
of respondents who thought the invention obvious in the perfect
hindsight case (p=0. 2 9 8 ). It is also statistically different, at least
weakly, from the 38% obviousness result in the other partial
hindsight scenario (p=0.0 7 ).
In addition to the difference in these obviousness results for the
third and fourth scenarios, we also saw a different pattern in the
obviousness responses. In the partial hindsight scenario, the
obviousness result started at 90% for the first of the four possible

blank. Even among those who could not think of a solution or who left this space blank, all
thirteen thought at least one of the proposed solutions was obvious; four thought two of the
solutions were obvious; and one thought three of the solutions were obvious. Seven of these
thirteen (or 54%) thought the actual solution was obvious-a percentage not statistically
different from the 58% obviousness result for the respondents as a whole with respect to the
actual solution.
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inventions and then decreased steadily over the remaining three.
There is no similar pattern in the engagement scenario. For the
first proposed solution, the obviousness result dropped from 90%
to 56%. For the third proposed solution, the obviousness result
remained statistically unchanged, moving from 16% in the third
scenario to 18% in the fourth. The obviousness result for the
fourth solution increased, moving from 6% in the third scenario to
48% in the fourth. Moreover, while the respondents in the third
and fourth scenarios rearranged their votes as to which of the four
solutions were obvious, the total number of obviousness results
232
across the four solutions was statistically unchanged.
The results from this fourth scenario raise some troubling
issues. First, there should be no hindsight difference, let alone
bias, in the fourth scenario. After all, despite the introduction of
some hindsight information in the third scenario, there was no
difference in the obviousness result between the third scenario and
the original foresight scenario. Moreover, the third and fourth
scenarios contained identical hindsight information, presented in
an identical format. Yet the results of the fourth scenario are
statistically identical to the results from the pure hindsight
scenario. This suggests that the original difference we found
between the foresight and hindsight scenarios does not represent
hindsight bias. Rather, it appears more likely to represent merely
an artifact of survey design.
Second, given that the same hindsight was present in the third
and fourth scenarios, the statistically different obviousness results
between the third and fourth scenarios must necessarily reflect
something other than hindsight. The only difference between the
third and fourth scenarios was that we asked the respondents in
the fourth scenario to write a brief suggested solution to the
problem. Given that it is the only difference between the two
scenarios, that request for engagement must somehow account for
the differing obviousness results.233
232 In the third scenario, the fifty respondents thought a solution was obvious a total of
seventy-five times across the four inventions. In the fourth scenario, the fifty respondents
thought a solution was obvious a total of eighty times across the four inventions.
233 As a matter of random chance, the two groups of respondents may have simply
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While we are open to other interpretations, we believe that the
difference in results between the third and fourth scenarios arose
because the fourth scenario's engagement corrects, either in whole
or in part, an otherwise inherent bias in obviousness
determinations. Specifically, we asked the decision maker in these
cases to resolve obviousness issues as if they were persons having
ordinary skill in the art. Yet they have no such skill. Lacking
such skill, our decision makers are likely to overestimate the
difficulty of solving any given technological problem. Absent the
technical background to understand the prior art references, see
the principles underlying them, and recognize their possible
connections, our obviousness decision maker, whether judge or
jury, may, if not at trial then certainly given the limited
information provided in Professor Mandel's survey format, see the
prior art references as inherently indecipherable. Allowing our
obviousness decision makers to use hindsight helps them
understand these references, see their principles, and recognize
their connections as if the decision makers had skill in the art.
The question remains, however, whether hindsight goes too far
and allows the decision maker to see these things too easily. Our
survey results are consistent with the proposition that the
availability of certain hindsight information, specifically the
knowledge that the problem was solved and how, helps the
decision maker neither too much nor too little, but just the right
amount. In our study, when we tried to correct for this lack of skill
by asking our respondents to engage the problem more like
persons having ordinary skill in the art, we get an obviousness
result that is at the same time (1) higher than the obviousness
results in the partial-hindsight-without-engagement scenario and
(2) statistically identical to the results in the pure hindsight
scenario. Taken together, these results suggest that the hindsight
at issue in Professor Mandel's study, rather than introducing a
bias into the system, may merely correct for a bias already
present. By using hindsight knowledge of the fact and nature of
perceived the obviousness issue differently. While our test for statistical significance
suggests a less than 10% chance that random chance alone accounts for the difference, it
does not foreclose that possibility entirely.
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the solution found, a person having no skill in the art can reach an
obviousness outcome that more closely parallels the outcome that
would have been reached by a person skilled in the art. Rather
than lead to bias and incorrect obviousness determinations, our
results suggest that the use of hindsight of this sort may improve
decisionmaking on the obviousness issue.
V. WHO'S AFRAID OF A LITTLE HINDSIGHT?

Our results thus suggest that we should not allow our fear of
hindsight to preclude a tough, vibrantly enforced nonobviousness
A robust nonobviousness requirement plays an
standard.
essential part in ensuring the efficiency of the patent system. It
reduces the extent to which the patent system overprotects
relatively easy innovations, and by doing so, it ensures that the
patent system can provide the more extensive protection necessary
to bring forth relatively difficult innovations.
Since its advent in 1982, the Federal Circuit has been reluctant
to enforce the nonobviousness requirement as vigorously as the
regional circuits and the Supreme Court had previously. Although
not the only factor, a fear of hindsight bias has played an
The fear is that even a
important role in this reluctance.
nonobvious advance will appear obvious once it has been made.
While long part of patent law, this fear has become paralyzing in
recent years, and it led, for example, the Federal Circuit to require
a teaching, suggestion, or motivation before elements from
different pieces of prior art could be combined to show obviousness.
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court
held that a teaching, suggestion, or motivation was not required
and otherwise attempted to reinvigorate the nonobviousness
requirement. Moreover, the Court expressly cautioned the Federal
Circuit that it "drew the wrong conclusion from the risk of courts
'234
and patent examiners falling prey to hindsight bias.
Nevertheless, despite a small post-KSR bump in enforcement, the

234

KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
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nonobviousness requirement remains a pale shadow of its former
self.
235
For patent law to "promote the Progress of. . . useful Arts"
effectively, this fear of hindsight and the resulting reluctance to
enforce a vibrant nonobviousness requirement needs to end. Of
course, it is possible that a judge or jury will too readily infer
obviousness from the mere fact that a solution has been found or
an invention has been made. Yet, against this possibility, the law
has long recognized a simple and effective response: If it were so
easy, why didn't someone else think of it? For nearly a hundred
years, courts held that this response adequately countered the risk
of hindsight bias that might otherwise arise from the mere fact of
invention.
In a pair of articles, Professor Mandel attempts to provide a
firmer basis for patent law's fear of hindsight. While his work
demonstrates a sharp difference in obviousness outcomes between
foresight and hindsight scenarios, we are not convinced (1) that his
results reflect likely real-world differences, rather than mere
artifacts of survey design; and (2) that his results, even if reflective
of real-world outcomes, represent a bias rather than merely a
difference. In other words, even if the foresight and hindsight
outcomes are different, it is not clear to us which comes closer to
the socially optimal obviousness outcome.
By expanding on Professor Mandel's work to include surveys
with "partial hindsight" and "partial hindsight with engagement"
scenarios, we set out to explore some of the weaknesses we
perceived in Professor Mandel's work.
While there remains
considerable work to be done in this area, our results are
consistent with the proposition that there is not a hindsight bias
problem in patent nonobviousness determinations.
From our
perspective, our fourth scenario, where respondents were given
four possible solutions and were asked to write a brief description
of their own ideas for a solution, comes closest to an unbiased and
realistic representation of nonobviousness litigation. For that
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scenario,
the
obviousness
outcomes
were
statistically
indistinguishable from those for the perfect hindsight scenario.
While we do not contend that our results definitively establish
that hindsight can never bias obviousness determinations, we
believe that our results tend to show that hindsight knowledge of
the fact of invention is unlikely to bias obviousness determinations
in the context of real-world litigation. To paraphrase Franklin D.
Roosevelt, when it comes to our fear of hindsight bias, the only
thing we may have to fear is our fear itself. We should not allow
our fear to prevent us from restoring the nonobviousness
requirement to its proper place in an efficient and well-functioning
patent system.

